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Abstract
Game-theoretic centrality is a flexible and sophisticated approach to iden-
tify the most important nodes in a network. It builds upon the methods from
cooperative game theory and network theory. The key idea is to treat nodes
as players in a cooperative game, where the value of each coalition is deter-
mined by certain graph-theoretic properties. Using solution concepts from
cooperative game theory, it is then possible to measure how responsible each
node is for the worth of the network.
The literature on the topic is already quite large, and is scattered among
game-theoretic and computer science venues. We review the main game-
theoretic network centrality measures from both bodies of literature and or-
ganize them into two categories: those that are more focused on the connec-
tivity of nodes, and those that are more focused on the synergies achieved
by nodes in groups. We present and explain each centrality, with a focus on
algorithms and complexity.
1 Introduction
In many social networks, certain nodes play more important roles than others.
For example, popular individuals with frequent social contacts are more likely to
spread a disease in the event of an epidemic Dezso˝ and Baraba´si (2002); airport
hubs such as Heathrow or Schiphol concentrate intercontinental passenger traffic
Adler and Golany (2001); and certain parts of the brain’s neural network may be
indispensable for breathing or to perform other fundamental actions Keinan et al.
(2004). As a result, the concept of network centrality, which aims to quantify
the importance of nodes and edges, has been extensively studied in the literature
Koschu¨tzki et al. (2005); Brandes and Erlebach (2005).
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A number of centrality measures have been proposed in the literature, and among
the best known of these are degree, closeness, betweenness, and eigenvector cen-
tralities Freeman (1979); Bonacich (1972). Degree centrality quantifies the power
of a node by the number of its incident edges. For example, nodes v1 and v2 in the
network in Figure 1 have degree 5 and, from the perspective of degree centrality,
these are the key nodes in the network. On the other hand, closeness centrality
promotes nodes that are close to all other nodes in the network (i.e., nodes from
which it is possible to reach other nodes in a smaller number of steps are ranked
higher). According to this measure, node v8 in Figure 1 is ranked highest. Next,
betweenness centrality counts shortest paths (i.e., paths that use the minimal num-
ber of links) between any two nodes in the network and ranks nodes according to
the number of shortest paths they belong to. With this ranking, v2 in Figure 1
becomes the top node. Finally, eigenvector centrality is based on the idea that
connections to more important nodes should be valued more than otherwise equal
connections to less important nodes Bonacich (1972). In this case, node v2 in
Figure 1 is again ranked highest.
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Figure 1: Sample network of 12 nodes. The top nodes are v1 and v2 according to
degree centrality, v8 according to closeness centrality, v2 according to between-
ness centrality, and again v2 according to eigenvector centrality.
Since real-world networks have certain specific features, and there are various
perspectives from which they need to be analyzed, several extensions to the above
classical measures have been proposed in the literature. One such extension is the
concept of group centrality introduced by Everett and Borgatti (1999), where the
notions of classical centrality measures are extended to groups of nodes instead of
only individual nodes. By doing so, it is possible to capture synergies that emerge
when the roles of nodes are considered jointly. To illustrate this, let us assume
that the network from Figure 1 represents districts in a city, and edges are com-
munication routes. Our aim is to identify locations for two hospitals, so that they
can be reached as quickly as possible from any district in the city. Taking the two
top nodes from the ranking obtained using closeness centrality (i.e., v8 and v2) in
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this case does not lead to an optimal outcome, since those two nodes are adjacent
to each other. On the other hand, considering the joint closeness centrality of all
pairs of nodes is the better approach, since {v1, v2}, {v1, v3}, {v1, v9}, or {v1, v10}
each constitute an optimal outcome.
Although the concept of group centrality addresses the issue of synergy between
the nodes when their role is considered jointly, it suffers from a fundamental de-
ficiency. There is an exponential number of such groups and, even if one could
examine all of them, it is not clear how to construct a consistent ranking of in-
dividual nodes using the group results. Specifically, should the nodes from the
most valued groups be ranked highest? Or should we focus on nodes from the
group with the highest average performance per node? Or maybe the nodes which
contribute most to every group they join are the best? In fact, there are very many
possibilities to choose from.
In this paper we discuss the existing literature on game-theoretic network centrality—
a recent research direction that provides a compelling answer to the above ques-
tions by applying techniques rooted in cooperative game theory.1 The literature
on the topic has been expanding over the past years, and is scattered among game-
theoretic and computer science venues.
We identify two separate lines of research in game-theoretic network centrality.
The first is primarily concerned with applying existing and developing new coop-
erative solution concepts that essentially depend on an underlying network struc-
ture. In other words, these solution concepts can be applied only to networks and
are not well-defined otherwise. We refer to the centrality measures from this line
of research as game-theoretic measures based on connectivity, since the solution
concepts that it is concerned with typically attempt to account for the role played
by nodes in connecting otherwise disconnected groups in the network. The My-
erson value Myerson (1977) is probably the most well-known such concept.
On the other hand, the second line of research is concerned with applying (both
new and existing) cooperative solution concepts for regular cooperative games to
specific classes of cooperative games defined on networks through group central-
ity measures. We refer to the measures from this line of research as game-theoretic
centrality measures not based on connectivity.
In what follows, we present a comprehensive review of both types of game-
theoretic centrality, with particular emphasis on computational complexity. Sec-
1We note that there exists a literature on a game-theoretic approach to network centrality based
on non-cooperative game theory, e.g., Calvo´-Armengol (2001). Nevertheless, it is customary
in the literature to use the term game-theoretic network centrality for techniques pertaining to
cooperative game-theory applied to the analysis of node centrality in networks. We will follow
this convention also in this article.
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tion 2 introduces necessary notation and definitions. In Section 3, we define the
concept of game-theoretic network centrality and show the difference between this
approach to centrality and the classic ones. Section 4 deals with game-theoretic
network centrality measures based on connectivity, while Section 5 deals with
those that are not. In Section 6 we present some applications of game-theoretic
network centrality considered in the literature. Conclusions follow.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we will introduce the key concepts pertaining to cooperative game
theory and graph theory.
2.1 Game-Theoretic Concepts
We first discuss the basic model of cooperative games, its generalisation, the con-
cepts of the unanimity basis and dividends. Next, we introduce a number of so-
lution concepts in cooperative game theory—the cornerstone on which all the
game-theoretic network centralities discussed in this article are built.
Cooperative games: A cooperative game consists of a set of players, I =
{1, 2, . . . , n}, and a characteristic function, ν : 2I → R, that assigns to each
coalition C ⊆ I of players a real value indicating its performance (we assume
ν(∅) = 0). A cooperative game in characteristic function form, then, is a pair
(I, ν). Following convention, we will refer to such a game by ν, omitting the set
of players.
Types of Cooperative Games: Let us single out the following types of coop-
erative games:
• ν is superadditive if and only if ν(S ∪ T ) ≥ ν(S) + ν(T ) for all S, T ⊆ I
such that S ∩ T = ∅. This means that when two disjoint coalitions join,
their worth is at least the sum of their values. In other words, there is no
negative synergy;
• ν is convex if and only if ν(S ∪ T ) + ν(S ∩ T ) ≥ ν(S) + ν(T ) for all
S, T ⊆ I . This property captures the “snowballing” effect. In other words,
the incentive to join a coalition rises as the coalition increases in size; and
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• ν is symmetric if and only if there exists a function f such that ν(S) =
f(|S|) for all S ⊆ I . That is, the value of a coalition depends only on its
size, and not on the individual properties of its members.
Convex games were defined by Shapley (1971). Superadditive and symmetric
games are also discussed in this paper.
Unanimity Basis and Harsanyi Dividends for Cooperative Games: It is pos-
sible to express any characteristic function ν as a linear combination of the una-
nimity basis for I . For every set of players I there exists a unanimity basis consist-
ing of 2n − 1 unanimity games (one for each subset of I , excluding the empty set
∅), where n is the number of players in I . A unanimity game, uS (where S ⊆ I),
has the following form:
uS(C) =
{
1 if S ⊆ C
0 otherwise
.
In other words, we say a coalition C is winning if it contains all of the players
in S, and losing otherwise. It is not difficult to see that the unanimity games do
indeed form a basis. Since the space of characteristic functions with n players can
be interpreted as a (2n − 1)-dimensional vector space, and it is easy to check that
each of the 2n − 1 elements in the unanimity basis is linearly independent, then it
follows that the unanimity basis has to span the whole space.
For any cooperative game, we call its coordinates in the unanimity basis the
Harsanyi Dividends Harsanyi (1958), where the coordinate of us is denoted by
∆ν(S). This results in the following:
ν(C) =
∑
S⊆I
∆ν(S)uS(C). (1)
It can be proven that:
∆ν(S) =
∑
T⊆S
(−1)|S|−|T |ν(T ). (2)
Perhaps a more illuminating (albeit recursive) definition of Harsanyi dividends is
as follows:
∆ν(S) = ν(S)−
∑
T⊂S
∆ν(T ). (3)
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Solution Concepts for Cooperative Games: Assuming that the grand coali-
tion—the coalition consisting of all players in the game—is formed, and assuming
that it has the highest value2 according to ν, a key question of cooperative game
theory is how to distribute the value of the coalition among its members (i.e., to
give each player their payoff from joining the coalition).
The Shapley Value: An important solution concept was proposed by (Shap-
ley:1953), based on the concept of marginal contribution. The Shapley value of
player i, denoted by SVi(ν), is then equal to a weighted average of the marginal
contributions of i to every coalition that she or he can belong to. In more detail, let
Π(I) be the set of all permutations of the set of n players, I , i.e., every pi ∈ Π(I)
is a bijection from {1, 2, . . . , n} to itself, where pi(i) is the position of player i.
Let Cpi(i) be the coalition consisting of the players that precede i in pi. That is,
Cpi(i) = {j ∈ I : pi(j) < pi(i)}. Then, the Shapley value of i is the average
marginal contribution of player i to Cpi(i) over all permutations pi of I . Formally,
SVi(ν) =
1
n!
∑
pi∈Π(I)
[ν(Cpi(i) ∪ {i})− ν(Cpi(i))]. (4)
Equivalently, we can write the Shapley value in a (computationally) simpler form:
SVi(ν) =
∑
C⊆I\{i}
|C|!(n− |C| − 1)!
n!
[ν(C ∪ {i})− ν(C)]. (5)
The Shapley value may also be expressed in terms of the Harsanyi Dividends
and synergies that we discussed earlier in this section. Intuitively, the Harsanyi
dividend of a coalition represents the unique synergy achieved by the coalition.
Since this synergy is achieved jointly by the coalition members, then it is only
“fair” that it is distributed evenly among them. In formal terms:
SVi(ν) =
∑
C∈{C:C⊆I and i∈C}
∆ν(C)
|C| . (6)
We refer the reader to the work of (Pruzhansky:2005) and (Macho-Stadler:et:al:2010)
for an in-depth introduction to Harsanyi dividends and their relation to solution
concepts in cooperative game theory.
Among the many interesting properties of the Shapley value is the fact that it is
the unique solution concept satisfying the following four desirable axioms:
2Of course, there exist solution concepts for games where the grand coalition is not optimal.
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• Efficiency—the whole value of the grand coalition is distributed. That is,∑
i∈I SVi(ν) = ν(I);
• Symmetry—the payoffs of the players do not depend on their identities;
• Null-player—players whose marginal contributions are equal to zero for all
coalitions receive zero payoff; and
• Additivity—for any two games with the same player set, (I, ν1) and (I, ν2),
the sum of the payoffs for both games is equal to the payoff of the sum of the
games for all players. That is, for every player i in I , SVi(ν1) + SVi(ν2) =
SVi(ν1 + ν2), where (ν1 + ν2)(C) = ν1(C) + ν2(C).
(Young:1985) showed that the Null-Player and Additivity axioms can be replaced
by the strong monotonicity axiom:
• Strong Monotonicity—for any two games ν and ω with the same player
set I , if for a player i we have MC ν(S, i) ≥ MC ω(S, i) for every coalition
S ⊆ (I \ {i}), then SVi(ν) ≥ SVi(ω).
In the network theory context, this axiom can be interpreted as follows. If we
consider two graphs with the same node set, then node i will be worth more in the
graph in which it has a better (i.e., more central) position. Note that there exist in
the literature many other characterisations of the Shapley value, i.e., properties or
axioms that uniquely define it (the set of axioms above is just one example).
Semivalues: The Shapley value is an example of a more general class of divi-
sion schemes called semivalues. The Banzhaf index of power Banzhaf (1965),
which was originally introduced for voting games, is another example. In partic-
ular, semivalues assign to each player the expected value of his or her marginal
contribution to any coalition with some probability distribution over the size of
the coalition. In the context of semivalues, one can interpret the Shapley value
as the expected marginal contribution of a player i such that the probability of i
joining a random coalition of a certain size is equal to the probability of i joining
a random coalition of any other size. The Banzhaf index, on the other hand, can
be interpreted as the expected marginal contribution such that a player joins any
random coalition (regardless of size) with uniform probability. In general, semi-
values allow for any distribution over the size of coalitions, but the probability of
drawing any two coalitions of the same size must be the same. We will denote by
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β(k) the probability that a player joins a random coalition of size k. Formally, the
general formula for semivalues is as follows:
φβi (ν) =
∑
0≤k≤n−1
β(k)E[MC ν(Ck(I \ {i}), i)], (7)
where Ck(I \ {i}) is a random variable ranging over the set of all coalitions of
size k being drawn with uniform probability from the set I \ {i} and E[·] is the
expected value operator. Alternatively, we present a formulation of semivalues
without the need for an expected value operator below:
φi(ν) =
n−1∑
k=0
∑
C∈Ck(I\{i})
β(k)
MCν(i, C)(
n−1
k
) , (8)
where we slightly abuse notation for Ck(I \ {i}) now referring to all subsets of
size k of the set I \ {i}. The Shapley value Shapley (1953) and the Banzhaf index
of power Banzhaf (1965) are defined by the β-functions βShapley and βBanzhaf ,
respectively, where:
βShapley(k) =
1
n
and βBanzhaf (k) =
(
n−1
k
)
2n−1
.
It is worth noting that the Banzhaf index is not an efficient semivalue, i.e., it does
not necessarily distribute the entire worth of the grand coalition among the play-
ers. In this sense, the Banzhaf index is not suitable as a payoff-division scheme.3
Interestingly, the Shapley value is in fact the only efficient semivalue, i.e., the only
one satisfying the aforementioned Efficiency property.
The significance of semivalues in the context of game-theoretic centralities is that
they provide a method for specifying the importance of certain types of synergy.
A trivial example is to give a weight of 1 to the empty coalition (i.e., β(0) = 1)
and 0 to all other coalitions. In this case, synergy is not considered at all. If this
semivalue is applied to group degree, group betweenness or group closeness, then
the resulting measure is the standard degree, betweenness or closeness measure.
In essence, this answers the question “what can a player achieve on his or her
own.” Going further, by varying the ratio between the weight of the empty coali-
tion and the non-empty coalitions, it is possible to specify the relative impact of
synergy on the ranking of players. On the other hand, giving coalitions of size
n− 1 a weight of 1 (i.e., β(n− 1) = 1) and all other coalitions a weight of 0, the
resulting semivalue answers the question “how much would all the players lose
3It is possible to rescale the Banzhaf index, however it then loses the property of Additivity.
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were a single player to leave.” Semivalues give the possibility of fine-tuning the
types of contributions and synergies that are important in determining the worth
of players or—in the case of networks—nodes.
Owen Value: Importantly, semivalues assume that all types of interactions be-
tween players are possible (i.e., anyone can contribute to any coalition). To relax
this assumption, Owen (1977) introduced a solution concept—now known as the
Owen value—that limits interactions of players to only the other players in their
communities. This requires the extension of the standard cooperative setting to
include a community/coalition structure CS = {Q1, Q2, . . . Qm}, which is sim-
ply a non-overlapping partition of the player set I . The Owen value divides the
payoff of any a priori coalition structure CS among the communities in CS and
the value of each of these communities is distributed fairly and efficiently among
its members. Assuming i ∈ Q ∈ CS , formally, the Owen Value is defined as
follows:
OVi(ν,CS ) =
∑
T∈CS\Q
∑
C∈Q
1
|CS |(|CS |−1|T | ) 1|Q|(|Q|−1|C| )MC
(
(
⋃
T ) ∪ C
)
(9)
Now, when CS = {I} or CS = {{i}}i∈I , the Owen value is equivalent to the
Shapley value. As such, the Owen value is a generalization of the Shapley value;
one that does not generalise the β function (as semivalues do), but rather gen-
eralises the assumed coalition structure CS . While the details are beyond the
scope of this article, we will mention that the Owen value is uniquely charac-
terised by the following axioms: Efficiency, Null Player, Symmetry, Linearity,
and Coalitional Symmetry. We have already introduced the first three of these
axioms when discussing the Shapley value. If a payoff division scheme, φi(ν),
satisfies linearity, then for any λ ∈ R and cooperative games ν1 and ν2, we have
φi(λν1 + ν2) = λφi(ν1) + φi(ν2). Coalitional Symmetry implies that if two com-
munities in CS contribute the same value to all coalitions of communities, then
their payoffs (i.e., the sum of the payoffs of their members) are the same.
Coalitional Semivalues: Another step in this line of research was taken by
Szczepan´ski et al. Szczepan´ski et al. (2014), who proposed a generalisation com-
bining both the Owen value and semivalues; they called it coalitional semivalues.
Formally, given a coalition structure, CS , and discrete probability distributions:
β : {0, . . . , |CS | − 1} → [0, 1] and αQ : {0, . . . , |Q| − 1} → [0, 1] coalitional
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semivalues are defined by:
γi(ν,CS ) =
|CS |−1∑
k=0
β(k)
|Q|−1∑
l=0
αQ(l)E
[
MC
((⋃
T k(CS \ {Q})) ∪ C l(Q \ {i}), i)]
(10)
whereQ is the coalition in CS that player i belongs to, T k(CS \{Q}) is a random
variable over subsets of size k chosen from CS \ {Q} with uniform probability,
C l(Q \ {i}) is a random variable over subsets of size l chosen from Q \ {i}
with uniform probability, and E is the expected value operator. The coalitional
semivalue is equivalent to the Owen value when β(k) = 1|CS | and αQ(l) =
1
|Q| .
Solution Concepts for Games with Overlapping Communities: None of the
solution concepts discussed thus far considers overlapping communities. To ad-
dress this issue, Albizuri et al. Albizuri et al. (2006) generalised the Owen value
to situations where the a priori coalition structure CS contains overlapping com-
munities; they called this generalisation the Configuration value. Formally, it is
defined as follows, where T (i) = {Q : Q ∈ CS and i ∈ Q}: ————————
-
χi(ν,CS ) =
∑
T⊆CS
T∩T (i)=∅
∑
Q∈T (i)
∑
C⊆Q
i 6∈C
λMC
((⋃
T
) ∪ C, i), (11)
where
λ =
|T |!(|CS | − |T | − 1)!
|CS |!
|C|!(|Q| − |C| − 1)!
|Q|!
Interaction Indices: The concept of Interaction indices is intimately connected
to payoff division schemes and synergies. We already mentioned that synergies
can be used to evaluate the similarity of nodes, since if two players have negative
synergy, then this is likely to indicate that their functions are similar and therefore
redundant. Given this, (Owen:1972) defined the interaction between two players
as their expected synergy given a random coalition. We refer to this index as the
Shapley value interaction index, which is defined as follows:
IShapleyi,j (ν) =
∑
pi∈Π(Ii∧j)
Sν(Cpi({i, j}), i, j)
(n− 1)! , (12)
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where I i∧j is the set I such that the elements i ∈ I and j ∈ I are replaced by a
single element {i, j}. In other words, this can be interpreted as the Shapley value
of the player {i, j} in the game where i and j join to create one player minus
the Shapley value of player i in the game where j is removed minus the Shapley
value of player j in the game where i is removed. (Grabisch:1999) continued this
work and introduced the Banzhaf interaction index. (Szczepanski:2015b) gener-
alised these concepts further by introducing semivalue interaction indices, defined
below:
ISEMIi,j (ν) =
n−2∑
k=0
∑
C∈Ck(I\{i,j})
β(k)
Sν(C, i, j)(
n−2
k
) (13)
(Szczepanski:2016b) extended the concept further to allow for a priori community
structures and defined the Coalitional semivalue interaction indices. Assuming i
belongs to community P , and j to Q, we define them as follows:
ICoSemii,j (ν) =
|CS |−2∑
k=0
β(k)
|Q|+|P |−2∑
l=0
α|P |+|Q|−2(l)
∑
T∈Ck(CS\{P,Q})
∑
C∈Cl(N\{i,j})
Sν
(⋃
T ∪ C, i, j
)
(|CS |−2
k
)(|P |+|Q|−2
l
) , (14)
where Ck(P ) = {C : C ⊆ P and |C| = k} are subsets of size k of the set P .
We finish our discussion of concepts from cooperative game theory by introducing
a generalisation of characteristic functions, where the order of group of players
impacts their value.
Generalised cooperative games: Of relevance to some of the work related to
this article are generalised cooperative games. Like its standard counterpart, a
generalised cooperative game also contains a set of n players, I = {1, 2, . . . , n}.
However the function that defines the game, which is called a generalised char-
acteristic function, is slightly different. Generalised characteristic functions take
into account the order of players. Consequently, the value of an ordered coalition
not only depends on the identities of the players therein, but also their order. For-
mally, a generalised characteristic function is a function from the set of all ordered
subsets of I to the real numbers. We will denote by piC : C 7→ {1, 2, . . . , |C|} a
permutation of the set C and by Ω(I) the set of all ordered coalitions of I , i.e.,
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Ω(I) =
⋃
C⊆I Π(C). A generalised characteristic function, then, is denoted as
follows: ν∗ : Ω(I)→ R.
Unanimity Basis and Dividends for generalised Cooperative Games: The
unanimity basis for generalised cooperative games is defined in a similar fashion
to the unanimity basis for regular cooperative games. First, we must define a
partial order, ⊆˜, on the set of ordered coalitions Ω(I). For S,C ∈ I we will
define ⊆˜ as follows:
piS⊆˜piC if and only if S ⊆ C and ∀s,t∈SpiC(s) < piC(t) implies piS(s) < piS(t)
If S ⊂ C, i.e., the inclusion is strict, then we will write piS⊂˜piC . The generalised
unanimity basis, then, is the set of all generalised characteristic functions indexed
by ordered coalitions of the form:
w∗piC (piS) =
{
1 if piC⊆˜piS
0 otherwise
In other words, any generalised characteristic function ν∗ can be written in the
form:
ν∗(piC) =
∑
pi∈Ω(I)
∆∗ν∗(pi)w
∗
pi(piC),
where ∆∗ν∗(pi),∀pi ∈ Ω(I) are coefficients, which we call generalised dividends.
(Sanchez:Bergantinos:1997) showed that:
∆∗ν∗(piC) = ν
∗(piC)−
∑
pi⊂˜piC
∆∗ν∗(pi). (15)
Now if, for all ordered coalitions pi1, pi2 with the same set of players S (i.e.,
pi1, pi2 ∈ Π(S)) we have a generalised cooperative game such that ν∗(pi1) =
ν∗(pi2), then this game is just a regular cooperative game. We can rewrite the ba-
sis for this game as u∗S =
∑
piS∈Π(S)wpiS , which is simply equal to the unanimity
basis of a regular cooperative game with Harsanyi dividends (with the difference,
that it accepts ordered coalitions, rather than unordered ones).
2.2 Graph-Theoretic Concepts
A network is a weighted digraph D = (V,E, ω), where V is a set of nodes, E is a
set of edges, i.e., ordered pairs (v, u) of nodes in V with v 6= u, and ω : E → R+
is a weight function from edges to the positive real numbers. A weighted digraph
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D = (V,E, ω) is said to be undirected if (i) (v, u) ∈ E implies (u, v) ∈ E
and (ii) ω((v, u)) = ω((u, v)) for all (u, v) ∈ E. In that case, D is also said
to be a weighed graph. A weighted graph or digraph D = (V,E, ω) is said to
be unweighted if ω(e) = 1 for all e ∈ E. Unweighted graphs and unweighed
digraphs we also refer to as simply graphs and digraphs, respectively, and, in that
case, we will generally omit the reference to ω in the signature.
A path pist from a source node s to destination node t in a graph G is an ordered
set (v0, v1, . . . , vk) such that v0 = s and vk = t and (vi, vi+1) ∈ E for all i with
1 ≤ i < k. We will define Paths(s, t) as the set of paths between nodes s and t
and SP(G) as the set of all shortest paths in G. We define the set of neighbours
of a node v by E(i) = {j : (i, j) ∈ E}. The neighbour set of a subset C of
nodes is defined as E(C) =
⋃
i∈C E(i) \C. We refer to the degree of a node v by
deg(v) = |E(v)|. The distance from a node s to a node t is denoted by dist(s, t)
and is defined as the length of the shortest path (i.e., sum of the edge weights
between subsequent nodes in the path) between s and t. The distance between a
node v and a subset of nodesC ⊆ V is denoted by dist(C, v) = minu∈C dist(u, v).
Paths, neighbours, and distances are prominent in definitions of network centrality
measures, i.e., functions that associate with each node a real value that represents
its centrality, and we will refer to them as (graph) items.
By G[S], where G = (V,E) and S ⊆ V , we denote the subgraph of G induced
by S. In other words, G[S] = (S,E ′), where E = {(u, v) : (u, v) ∈ E and u ∈
S and v ∈ S}. We say that a graph is connected if and only if there exists a
path between any two nodes in the graph. We define the connected components
of a graph G(V,E), denoted by KG(V ), as the set of sets of nodes that represent
all maximal sub-graphs of G such that they are connected. In other words, C ∈
KG(V ) if and only if C is connected, and for any nonempty C ′ ⊆ V \ C, C ∪ C ′
is not connected. For C ⊆ V we will denote by KG(C) the maximal connected
components of G[C] (or just K(C) when G is apparent from the context).
Example 1 Figure 2 presents a sample graph of 9 nodes, which we will refer to as
G. Since G is connected, then K(V ) = {{v1, v2, v3, v4, v5, v6, v7, v8, v9}}. Let us
consider a disconnected group of nodes, C = {v1, v2, v3, v6, v7, v8}. The maximal
subsets of C that are connected in G (i.e., the connected components of C), are
given by: K(C) = {{v1, v2, v3}, {v6, v7, v8}}.
The adjacency matrix of a graph G, denoted by AG, is the matrix indexed by the
set of nodes V in G(V,E) such that AG[i, j] = 1 if (i, j) ∈ E and AG[i, j] = 0
otherwise.
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Figure 2: Sample network of 8 nodes.
Classic Node Centrality: We now present the three classic notions of node cen-
trality as introduced by Freeman Freeman (1979) and Eigenvector centrality due
to (Bonacich:1972).
1. Degree Centrality ranks nodes according to how many neighbours they
have. The larger the neighbourhood of a node, the more central it is. For-
mally:
degree(v) = |E(v)|
Example 2 In Figure 2, the node with the highest degree centrality is v3,
having a degree of 4 (its neighbors are v1, v2, v4, and v9). Next, v5 has 3
neighbors (v4, v6, and v7). The third place in the ranking is a four-way tie
between the nodes v4, v6, v7, and v8 each of which have degree 2. Finally,
nodes v1, v9 and v2 are ranked last.
2. Betweenness Centrality ranks a node according to how many shortest paths
in the network it lies on. Often, the additional constraint is added that paths
do not contribute to the rank of their source and destination nodes. Formally,
let σ(s,t) be the number of shortest paths between s and t, and σ(s,t)(v) be
the number of shortest paths between s and t that visit v. Given this, be-
tweenness centrality is defined as follows:
betweenness(v) =
∑
s,t∈V \{v}
σ(s,t)(v)
σ(s,t)
A simpler version of betweenness is called stress centrality. As opposed to
betweenness, which normalises the paths that a node lies on by the number
of paths between any source and target node, stress centrality simply counts
the number of paths that a node lies on. It is defined as follows:
stress(v) =
∑
s,t∈V \{v}
σ(s,t)(v)
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Example 3 In Figure 2, the node with the highest betwenness centrality is
v3, with a centrality of 36. Nodes v4 and v5 follow with a centrality of 33 and
32, respectively. Continuing, nodes v6 and v7 have a centrality of 6 each.
Finally, v8 has a centrality of 1 and all the other nodes have a centrality of
0, since they do not play any intermediary role in any of the paths in the
network.
3. Closeness Centrality ranks nodes based on their distances to other nodes.
The most classical version of the centrality ranks a node according to the
sum of the distances from it to any other node in the network:
closeness(v) =
∑
u∈V
dist(v, u).
This results in an inverse ranking (i.e., nodes that are more important have
smaller value). A popular variation on closeness Michalak et al. (2013b),
which results in a ranking such that more important nodes have higher value,
uses some non-increasing function of distance, f : R→ R, rather than dis-
tance itself. This generalised form of closeness is referred to as the influence
game by (Michalak:et:al:2013b). For clarity, however, we refer to it sim-
ply as generalised closeness throughout this article. Formally, generalised
closeness is defined as follows:
generalised closeness(v) =
∑
u∈V
f(dist(v, u)).
When f(k) = 1
k
the resulting measure is called harmonic closeness Boldi
and Vigna (2013).
Example 4 In Figure 2, the node with the best closeness centrality is v4,
since the sum of its distances to other nodes is 15. Next, for nodes v3 and v5
this value is 16, for nodes v6 and v7 it is 21, for v1, v2 and v9 it is 23, and
node v8 comes in last with 26.
4. Eigenvector Centrality, CE(v), assigns to each node v in G the vth entry
of an eigenvector with the largest eigenvalue of the adjacency matrix of G.
More formally, let ~x be an eigenvector with the largest eigenvalue, λ. That
is, if AG is the adjacency matrix of G, then λ is the largest value such that
there exists a vector ~y for which we have AG~y = λ~y. Moreover, let ~x be an
eigenvector for this value, i.e., AG~x = λ~x. Then:
eigenvector(v) = ~x[v]
15
Example 5 In Figure 2, the node with the highest eigenvector centrality is
v4, with a centrality of 0.486919. Next is v5 with 0.401595, then v6 and v7
with 0.395147, v3 with 0.350707, v8 with 0.255378, and v1, v2 and v9 with
0.210938.
Group Centrality: For the purposes of this article, we define group centrality
as follows:
Definition 1 (Group centrality) In general, we will use the variable ψ to denote
a group centrality measure. Formally, ψ maps any graph G = (V,E) onto a
characteristic function ν : 2V → R.
We present below some classic group centralities due to Everett and Borgatti Ev-
erett and Borgatti (1999). These group centrality measures are a natural extension
of the centrality measures introduced by Freeman Freeman (1979).
1. Group Degree Centrality of a group of nodes S is defined as the size of the
neighbourhood of this group. Formally, group degree centrality in a graph
G is defined as:
ψD(G)(S) = νDG (S) = |{v : v ∈ E(S) \ S}|;
2. Group Betweenness Centrality of a group of nodes S is defined as the num-
ber of shortest paths that visit at least one node in S. Often (but not always),
the additional assumption is made that the source and destination nodes of
these paths cannot belong to S. Let σ(s,t) be the number of shortest paths
between the nodes s and t, and σ(s,t)(S) be the number of shortest paths be-
tween s and t that visit at least one node in S. Formally, group betweenness
centrality in a graph G is defined as:
ψB(G)(S) = νBG (S) =
∑
s,t∈V \S
σ(s,t)(S)
σ(s,t)
.
3. Group Closeness Centrality of a group of nodes S is defined as the sum of
the distances from S, to any node outside of S. This results in a ranking,
where groups with lower value are—on average—closer to the nodes out-
side of the group, and therefore more central. Formally, group closeness
centrality in a graph G is defined as:
ψCL(G)(S) = νCLG (S) =
∑
v∈V \S
dist(S, v);
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Similarly to closeness centrality, group closeness centrality can be gener-
alised such that more central groups have a higher rank. This extension was
called the influence game by (Michalak:et:al:2013b), and it is defined with
the help of a non-increasing function f : R→ R in the following manner:
ψCLf (G)(S) = ν
CL
G,f (S) =
∑
v∈V \S
f(dist(S, v)); (16)
When f(k) = 1
k
, the resulting measure is called harmonic group closeness
Boldi and Vigna (2013).
In all instances, when the graph G in question is obvious in a given context, we
skip the subscriptGwhen referring to the characteristic function. ForψCL(f,G)(S)
and νCLG,f (S), we skip the subscript f whenever it is obvious in a given context.
This allows us to reduce a clutter of notation.
3 The Definition of Game-Theoretic Centrality Mea-
sure
We are now in a position to define game-theoretic centrality, which can be viewed
as a method to rank nodes by aggregating the centralities of (typically all) groups
of nodes in a network. In particular, in this approach nodes are treated as players
in a cooperative game and their groups as coalitions. The characteristic function
is typically some group centrality measure (such as those described above) and
a chosen solution concept is the method of aggregation. In the context of this
article, a pair of any given group centrality measure and solution concept can be
considered a game-theoretic centrality measure, since it yields a ranking of nodes
in any graph.
Definition 2 (Game-theoretic centrality measure) A game-theoretic centrality
measure can be defined as a pair (ψ, φ) consisting of a group centrality ψ and
a cooperative solution concept φ. Givens G = (V,E), we will sometimes use a
characteristic function νG : 2V → R to refer to the group centrality measure.
Let us now look at the following example illustrating the concept of game-theoretic
centrality.
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Figure 3: A simple example.
C νB(C) C νB(C) C νB(C) C νB(C)
∅ 0 {a, b} 4 {a, b, c} 0 {a, b, c, d} 0
{a} 0 {a, c} 0 {a, b, d} 2 {a, b, c, e} 0
{b} 6 {a, d} 4 {a, b, e} 2 {a, b, d, e} 0
{c} 0 {a, e} 0 {a, c, d} 2 {a, c, d, e} 0
{d} 6 {b, c} 0 {a, c, e} 0 {b, c, d, e} 0
{e} 0 {b, d} 6 {a, d, e} 0 {a, b, c, d, e} 0
{b, e} 4 {b, c, d} 2
{c, d} 4 {b, c, e} 0
{c, e} 0 {b, d, e} 2
{d, e} 0 {c, d, e} 0
Table 1: The betweenness centralities of the coalitions of the network in Figure 3.
Example 6 Consider betweenness centrality and group betweenness centrality in
the network G depicted in Figure 3. Observe that, besides the direct edges, there
are also the following shortest paths between nodes :
abc, ade, bde, cba, cbd, cbde, dbc, eda, edb, edbc.
It can then easily be established that the betweenness centrality for nodes a, c,
and e is 0, whereas that of b and d totals to 6. The group centralities νB(C) (omit-
ting the reference to G) of the groups of nodes (coalitions) C are summarised in
Table 1. We can now use the Shapley value to aggregate the group centralities for
the individual nodes. In this way, we find that the game-theoretical betweenness
centralities for the Shapley value of the nodes a, b, c, d, and e are, respectively,
−2
5
, 3
10
, −7
6
, 3
10
, and −7
6
.
Let us now discuss the differences between the three approaches to centrality that
we mentioned—classic, group and game-theoretic—based on a sample network.
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Figure 4: A graph representing a sample delivery network. Edge weights represent
the physical distance between nodes.
In particular, let us consider a sample delivery network, where parcels (for in-
stance of data or physical mail) are transferred between nodes. Figure 4 presents
an example of such a network. Edge weights represent the distance between
nodes. Assume that we want to intercept parcels travelling through this network,
while the only thing we know is that deliveries are always made via the shortest
route. We can try to achieve this by placing a “mole” at any of the nodes. For
this task, we can model the importance of a node v using a variant of betweenness
centrality that we call stress centrality after Szczepan´ski et al. Szczepan´ski et al.
(2012):4
stress(v) =
∑
s∈V
∑
t∈V
σ(s,t)(v)
If we can only place one mole in this setting, then this “classic” approach to
betweenness centrality would give us the correct answer: nodes a and b are the
best nodes to place the mole, since they control the flow of 44 different shortest
paths each, which is more than any other node. However, what if we can place two
moles? Unfortunately, the classic approach to centrality is of little little help here,
since placing moles at the two nodes with the highest stress centrality—a and b—
does not guarantee us the greatest success. We could, for instance, do better by
placing a mole on b and another one on c, as together they control a larger number
of delivery paths. For this analysis, we must consider the group stress centrality,
4Since moles can also affect parcels at their own location, we make the slight modification of
also counting towards a node’s centrality the shortest paths that originate and end at this node.
19
which is defined for any group of nodes S as follows:
group stress(S) =
∑
s∈V
∑
t∈V
σ(s,t)(S)
We can now see that whereas the group {a, b} controls a combined number of 56
shortest paths, the two optimal groups of size 2—{a, c} and {b, c}—control 80
shortest paths each. Although the distinction between the definitions of the node
centrality and group centrality in this case may seem trivial given that only the
domain changes between the two definitions, two decades separate the two areas
of research.
On the other hand, what would be the best approach to defend against the random
placement of moles? Assume our objective is to secure as many of the shortest
paths as possible, i.e., clearing them from all moles that may be on them. Also
assume that we can send a single team to a single node to investigate whether it has
been compromised, and, if so, to neutralise the resident mole. Which node should
we send the team to first? This depends strongly on the number of nodes that we
believe are compromised. The catch is that by neutralising a mole at a node, we
may not succeed in securing any shortest paths through it, as each of them may
also be compromised by other moles. Consider the case where we know that two
moles are compromised (although any probability distribution that models how
many moles are likely to exist in the network can be used).
The question of where to send the team first is a complex issue and it is not imme-
diately obvious what we should optimise for. For instance, there is no “quickest”
way to ensure that all paths are not compromised. Given that the placement of
moles is random, this would require the checking of all nodes. One criterion that
we can optimise for is to ensure that we clear as many shortest paths as possi-
ble with our first visit. Intuitively, this would mean that we should visit a or b
first, since they control the most paths. This, however, is not the case given the
following two considerations:
1. The shortest paths that a lies on contain more nodes on average than those
that c lies on. We note that it is more likely that shortest paths that contain
more nodes are compromised, since a mole at any one node on the path
would suffice to tamper with deliveries. Given this, if we know that there are
two moles, then the likelihood of the second mole lying on a large number
of the same shortest paths that a lies on is higher than for c. This means that
even if we clear a of moles, the likelihood that the shortest paths it lies on
are still compromised is higher than for c.
2. Node a lies on many of the same shortest paths as b. This means that if b
is the other infected node, then clearing a of a mole leaves most of its paths
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still compromised. However—given that c has few common shortest paths
with other nodes—clearing c of a mole will clear most of its shortest paths
with absolute certainty.
As an example, consider all shortest paths from some li to some rj for i, j ∈
{1, 2, 3}. There are 9 paths of the form (li, a, b, rj) and 9 of the form (li, c, rj).
We see both considerations at work here:
1. The paths of this form that a lies on contain 4 nodes, whereas those that c
lies on contain 3 nodes, and
2. All 9 of the paths of this form that a lies on overlap with those that b lies
on. This means that if b also has a mole, then clearing a will leave all of
these paths compromised. On the other hand, if c has a mole, then clearing
it guarantees that at least 6 paths of this form are not compromised.
In order to capture the complex interactions between nodes and the synergies (both
positive and negative) that nodes exhibit when considered in groups, the semivalue
approach needs to be considered in order to analyse the expected number of short-
est paths “sterilised” after clearing a node. The semivalue for group stress central-
ity of a node v with the β function such that β(k) = 1 for k = 1 and β(k) = 0
otherwise gives us exactly the number of shortest paths that we will cure upon
removing a mole at a given location, given that all other nodes are equally likely
to be compromised. If c is compromised, then removing a mole placed there will
cure an expected number of 243
4
shortest paths, whereas removing a mole at a or
b will cure only an expected number of 163
4
shortest paths.
4 Game-Theoretic Node Centrality Measures Based
on Connectivity
In this section, we review the game-theoretic centralities that are based on connec-
tivity. Typically, this means that the centralities are based on, or inspired by, the
Myerson value and Myerson’s graph-restricted game Myerson (1977). In this ap-
proach, the model consists of a graph and a value function defined over all subsets
of nodes (who are treated as players in a cooperative game).
The next step is to construct a new cooperative game based on the above value
function and graph. In this context, we will say that the network topology “re-
stricts” the game, i.e., it is “graph restricted”. For now, we will leave this as an
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abstract concept, and discuss its variations when we get to the specific central-
ity measures. In particular, in Section 4.1, we formally introduce the Myerson
value and his graph-restricted game. In Section 4.2, we analyze the centrality
proposed by Go´mez et al. (2003), which is based on the Myerson value. Sec-
tion 4.3 presents the centrality due to del Pozo et al. (2011) for digraphs. The
centralities due to Amer et al. (2007) and Belau (2014) then follow in Sections 4.4
and 4.5, respectively. Section 4.6 discusses the Banzhaf network centrality, pro-
posed by Grofman and Owen (1982), which shares certain (but not all) traits with
the connectivity approach. Finally, in Sections 4.7 and 4.8 we discuss alternative
concepts of connectivity and graph-restricted games.
4.1 The Myerson Value and its Computational Properties
Graph-restricted games were introduced in Myerson’s seminal work from 1977
Myerson (1977). In the model analysed by Myerson, a network consists of play-
ers (nodes of the graph) who can communicate either directly, via the links that
directly connect them, or through intermediaries, i.e., when there exists a path in
the network between them. This network is represented by a graph, G. A natural
assumption, then, is that only players who communicate are able to cooperate.
This idea was embodied in a coalitional game, by introducing a value function,
ν : 2V → R, where ν(∅) = 0, that assigns to all coalitions a real value. However,
disconnected coalitions cannot communicate and therefore achieve this value. In
this context, a connected coalition is defined as a coalition for which there exists
a path between any two nodes belonging to the coalition, that visits nodes only
within the coalition. In other words, a connected coalition is one that induces a
connected subgraph. We will write C(G) to denote the set of all connected coali-
tions that can be made of nodes within G.
Myerson (1977) proposed that the value of a disconnected coalition C, should
be the sum of the maximal connected components of the subgraph induced by
C. We will denote the set of all such connected components by K(C). Given
this we can formulate the definition of the characteristic function for Myerson’s
graph-restricted game, which we denote by νMG (S). Formally:
νMG (S) =
{
ν(S) if S ∈ C(G)∑
Ki∈K(S) ν(Ki) otherwise.
(17)
Myerson’s celebrated result Myerson (1977) is that the Shapley value of a node v
in this graph-restricted game, SV v(G; νMG ), is equal to his solution concept—now
known as the Myerson value—of v in the original game, denoted by MV v(G; ν).
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The Myerson value of node v is formally and uniquely defined by the following
axioms:
1. Efficiency in connected components: The entire payoff of a connected
component is distributed among the coalition members.
Formally: ∀Ki∈K(V )
∑
v∈KiMVv(G; ν) = ν(Ki);
2. Fairness: Any two players that are neighbours are rewarded equally for the
edge between them. In other words, if we add an edge (s, t) to G (denoted
by G ∪ (s, t)), then the Myerson value of s and t changes by the same
amount.
Formally: MVs(G∪(s, t); ν)−MVs(G; ν) = MVt(G∪(s, t); ν)−MVt(G; ν);
3. Stability: if ν is superadditive, then adding an edge (s, t) will not decrease
the payoff of s or t.
In the remainder of this section, we discuss an algorithm to compute the Myerson
value and then discuss how it can be used as a centrality measure.
4.1.1 An Algorithm for Computing the Myerson Value
A general algorithm for computing the Myerson value was proposed by Skibski
et al. (2014). This algorithm runs in O(|C(G)||E|) time, where |C(G)| is the
number of connected subgraphs of G. In general, this is difficult to improve upon,
since the number of steps to consider the values of all subgraphs (which are given
by the characteristic function ν) is O(|C(G)|), and for every subgraph O(|E|)
steps are required to identify its set of neighbors. Interestingly, given a polynomial
number of connected subgraphs, this algorithm also runs in polynomial time.
The pseudocode for the algorithm due to Skibski et al. (2014) is presented in Al-
gorithm 1. We briefly explain how it works. The basic idea is to traverse all con-
nected coalitions using depth-first search (DFS). During this process, an internal
variable—S—represents the “current” connected coalition. The main function—
DFSMyersonV Rec—is called recursively: once, where the node currently be-
ing processed by the DFS algorithm is included in S, and once, where that node
is forbidden from ever being included in S. By recursively calling this function in
such a manner, all connected coalitions are eventually traversed. During traversal
for some connected coalition, S, the algorithm stores in XN the neighbor set of
S. The Myerson value of node v is computed using Equation (4)—the formula of
the Shapley value—with the characteristic function for the graph-restricted game.
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Algorithm 1: The DFS-based algorithm for calculating the Myerson value due to
Skibski et al. (2014).
Input: Graph G=(V,E), function ν : C(G)→ R
Output: Myerson value for game νG
1 DFSMyersonV begin
2 sort nodes and list of neighbors by degree desc.;
3 for i← 1 to |V | do MVi(νf )← 0;
4 for i← 1 to |V | do
5 DFSMyersonV Rec(G, (vi), {vi}, {v1, . . . , vi−1}, ∅, 1);
6 DFSMyersonV Rec(G, path, S,X,XN, startIt) begin
7 v ← path.last();
8 for it← startIt to |E(v)| do
9 u← N (v).get(it); // it’s neighbor of v
10 if u 6∈ S ∧ u 6∈ X then
11 DFSMyersonV Rec(G, (path, u), S ∪ {u}, X,XN, 1);
12 X ← X ∪ {u}; XN ← XN ∪ {u};
13 else if u ∈ X then XN ← XN ∪ {u};
14 path.removeLast();
15 if path.length() > 0 then
16 startIt← N (path.last()).f ind(v) + 1);
17 DFSMyersonV Rec(G, path, S,X,XN, startIt);
18 else
19 foreach vi ∈ S do
20 MVi(νG)←MVi(νG) + (|S|−1)!(|XN |)!(|S|+|XN |)! ν(S);
21 foreach vi ∈ XN do
22 MVi(νG)←MVi(νG)− (|S|)!(|XN |−1)!(|S|+|XN |)! ν(S);
Recall that Equation (4) iterates over all permutations in Π(N), and for every
such permutation, pi, computes the marginal contribution that the node v makes to
Cpi(v)—the coalition of nodes preceding v in the permutation pi. The important
observation here, is that when we take the graph-restricted characteristic function
defined in Equation (17), the marginal contribution of v to Cpi(v) becomes:
νMG (Cpi(v)∪{v})−νMG (Cpi(i)) = ν(K1∪· · ·∪Kd∪{i})−ν(K1)−· · ·−ν(Kd),
(18)
where K1, . . . , Kd are the maximal connected subsets of Cpi(i) that are connected
to v. In other words, if v joins Cpi(v), then it connects these components, but
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not others. It is therefore possible to express the Myerson value as a weighted
sum over connected subsets S of the value ν(S). In order to do so, we must
compute for each such connected subset how many times it appears in the sum in
Equation (4). Based on these observations, for every connected coalition, S, when
computing the Myerson value of the node v, the algorithm distinguishes between
the following two possibilities:
• If v ∈ S, then ν(S) appears in the following part of Equation (18): ν(K1 ∪
· · · ∪Kd ∪ {v}). This happens whenever S = K1 ∪ · · · ∪Kd ∪ {v}. More
specifically, it happens in a permutation pi if and only if S \ {v} ⊆ Cpi(v)
and Cpi(v) ∩XN = ∅. Let us compute how many such permutations there
are by constructing them. First of all, since the players in N \ (XN ∪ S)
are completely irrelevant here, they can be placed in pi in any position. The
number of ways in which this can be done is:( |N |
|N | − |XN ∪ S|
)
(|N | − |XN ∪ S|)! = |N |!|XN ∪ S|! .
After placing those players, we still have |S ∪ NX| unassigned slots in pi,
which should be assigned as follows. The members of S \ {v} should be
placed in the first (|S| − 1) unassigned slots; there are (|S| − 1)! different
ways in which this can be done. After that, the first of the remaining slots
should be occupied by v, while the rest should be occupied by the members
of XN ; there are |XN |! different ways to do this. The total number of
permutations becomes:
|N |!(|S| − 1)!|XN |!
|XN ∪ S|! .
Now, since Equation (4) averages each marginal contribution over all |N |!
possible permutations, the value of S \ {v} must be divided by this coef-
ficient when computing the Myerson value of v. In other words, for any
connected coalition S that satisfies the above requirements, the value ν(S)
appears the following number of times when computing the Myerson value:
(|S| − 1)!|XN |!
|S ∪XN |! .
• On the other hand, if v /∈ S, then ν(S) can only appear in the following part
of Equation (18): −ν(K1)− · · · − ν(Kd). This happens whenever S = Kj
for some j ∈ {1, . . . , d}. More specifically, it happens in a permutation pi if
and only if S ⊆ Cpi(v) and Cpi(v) ∩ XN = ∅ and v ∈ XN . Just as in the
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previous case, it is possible to compute the number of ways in which such
a permutation can be constructed. We arrive at the following coefficient,
which is the number of times ν(S) appears when computing the Myerson
value of v:
− |S|!(|XN | − 1)!|S ∪XN |! .
The above two coefficients are used in lines 20 and 22 of Algorithm 1. We provide
a closed-form formula for the Myerson value based on these observations:
MVv(ν) =
∑
v∈S∈C(V )
(|S| − 1)!|E(S)|!
|S ∪ E(S)|! ν(S ∪ {v})
−
∑
S∈C(V ),v∈E(S)
|S|!(|E(S)| − 1)!
|S ∪ E(S)|! ν(S), (19)
where E(S) denotes the neighbor set of S, i.e., |E(S)| = XN from Algorithm 1.
We note that another expression that allows for polynomial computation of the
Myerson value given a polynomial number of connected coalitions was devel-
oped by Elkind (2014). Elkind further characterised the class of graphs for which
the number of connected coalitions is polynomial in |V |, thereby admitting poly-
nomial computation of the Myerson value and other solution concepts.
This concludes the discussion of the computation of the Myerson value.
4.1.2 The Myerson Value as a Centrality Measure
Since the Myerson value assigns values to individual nodes by taking into ac-
count the topology of the network, it can be thought of as a centrality measure, as
demonstrated in the following example:
Example 7 Let us consider the network presented in Figure 5 and the character-
istic function ν(C) = |C|2. This particular characteristic function was chosen
since it is superadditive, and it gains more and more value the more neighbours
join. In particular, if no network were present, each player would have an equal
Shapley value, which is 5. However, as soon as we take the network topology into
consideration, we find that not all players can participate as often in the larger
(more rewarding) coalitions. Since the game is quadratic (making it strictly con-
vex), rather than linear, this makes being in a central position in the network
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even more beneficial. The Myerson values for the nodes v1, v2, v3, v4 and v5 are
3.167, 6, 8.167, 3.333 and 3.333, respectively. Clearly, node v3 receive the highest
payoff, which reflects the fact that it plays the most important role in connecting
the other nodes. For instance, adding v3 to the coalition {v2, v4, v5} connects
them, changing the value of the coalition from 3 to 16.
v1 v2 v3
v4
v5
Figure 5: A sample network used to illustrate connectivity and how it impacts the
Myerson value
Having introduced graph-restricted games due to Myerson, over the next five sec-
tions, we will now show how these games were used in the literature to construct
different game-theoretic network centralities.
4.2 Centrality due to Go´mez et al. (2003)
Go´mez et al. Go´mez et al. (2003) propose to use the difference between the My-
erson value and the Shapley value of nodes within a network as a measure of
centrality. Formally, this measure is given by:
MVv(G; ν)− SVv(ν), (20)
whereMVv(G; ν) is the Myerson value of node v and SVv(ν) is its Shapley value.
Intuitively, this measure takes the Shapley value, which accounts for the impor-
tance of nodes without considering the network topology, and subtracts it from the
Myerson value, which accounts for the importance of nodes in a network context.
Hence, this measure of centrality quantifies how much power a node has gained
(or lost) due to its position in the network. However, note that when ν is sym-
metric, then SVv(ν) is equal for all v ∈ V . In this case, the centrality measure is
equivalent to the Myerson value (shifted by some constant).
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Since the Shapley value is simply used as an index of power of a player in the
game, the authors note that the Banzhaf index could be used instead. Indeed,
we note that any semivalue could be used depending on the application at hand.
As such, an interesting research direction would be to study what these different
power indices (i.e., solution concepts such as semivalues) would imply for the
centrality measure; clearly, many properties of the measure rely not only on ν but
also on the adopted solution concept.
Example 8 To demonstrate the basic idea behind the centrality measure due to
Go´mez et al. (2003), consider again the network in Figure 5. Here, given the
characteristic function ν(C) = |C|2, the centrality of v1, v2, v3, v4 and v5 is:
−2.167, 1, 3.167,−2.333 and −2.33, respectively. Since this game is symmet-
ric, these values are basically shifted Myerson values. It is possible, however, to
define a game that is not symmetric (and in this sense includes information that
is extraneous to the network), in which case the Gomez centrality can produce a
ranking different to that produced by the Myerson value.
4.3 Centrality in Directed Social Networks by del Pozo et al.
(2011)
del Pozo et al. del Pozo et al. (2011) build upon their previous work Go´mez et al.
(2003) presented in the above section and define a family of centrality measures
for directed social networks. In the previous section, Go´mez et al. (2003) used the
Shapley value as a measure of power that disregards the topology of the network,
whereas the Myerson value was used as a measure of power within the network.
The difference between the two values was then used as a measure of how much
power a node gains (or loses) due to its position in the network. del Pozo et al.
(2011) extend this measure to digraphs by proposing their version of digraph-
restricted games (as opposed to graph-restricted games). Here, the Shapley value
is used just as before, as a standard measure of power disregarding the network.
However, the Myerson value is replaced with a generalised solution concept (and
the digraph-restricted game is a generalised cooperative game), where the order
of the players matters in determining its value.
This approach makes sense for digraphs, since an ordered group of nodes may
communicate in a digraph only if each consequent node is connected. To achieve
this, the authors take an underlying model of a digraph, D, and cooperative game
ν. They then produce a generalised cooperative game that they refer to as the
digraph-restricted game, νP∗D , where P stands for Pozo, and develop a family
of generalised solution concepts in order to account for the importance of nodes
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in the digraph-restricted game. This family of measures, referred to by χα, is
parametrised by α, which takes any value in [0, 1]. On one extreme, when α = 0,
χα is equal to a solution concept proposed by Nowak and Radzik (1994), whereby
players may only join an ordered coalition at the very end. On the other ex-
treme, when α = 1, χα, it is equal to a solution concept proposed by Sanchez
and Bergantin˜os (1997), whereby players can join an ordered coalition at any po-
sition (including in between other nodes). This consequently impacts the types of
marginal contributions that players can make in a generalised cooperative game.
Setting α anywhere between the two extremes results in a hybrid of the two afore-
mentioned solution concepts. When α decreases, more value is given to the play-
ers that join an ordered coalition last. Let us now formally introduce the two
generalised solution concepts below.
Solution Concepts for Generalised Cooperative Games: Here, we briefly in-
troduce two prominent solution concepts for generalised cooperative games.5 To
this end, let piC = {c1, c2, . . . , c|C|} be a permutation of C. We will denote by
pi(i → l) a permutation of C ∪ {i} such that i is inserted in pi immediately af-
ter the l’th player (if l = 0, then i is inserted as the first player). Formally,
pi(i → l) = {c1, c2, . . . , cl, i, . . . , c|C|}. Let us first introduce the solution con-
cept, proposed by Sanchez and Bergantin˜os (1997). This solution concept, now
known as the Sanchez-Bergantinos value, is computed for a player i in a game
with a set of n players, I , and defined by the generalised characteristic function
ν∗, as follows:
ΨSBi (ν
∗) =
∑
pi∈Π(C),C⊆I\{i}
(n− |C| − 1)!
n!(|C|+ 1)
|C|∑
l=0
(ν∗(pi(i→ l))− ν∗(pi))
=
∑
piS∈Ω(n),i∈S
∆∗ν∗(piS)
|S|!|S| , (21)
where ∆∗ν∗(piS) denotes the generalised dividends, discussed earlier in Section 2
and defined formally in Equation (15) and Ω(I) is the set of all ordered coalitions
of I , i.e., Ω(I) =
⋃
C⊆I Π(C). The other solution concept we wanted to discuss
is the Nowak-Radzik value, which was proposed by Nowak and Radzik (1994).
This solution concept is computed for a player i in a game with a set of n players,
I , and defined by the generalised characteristic function ν∗, as follows:
5The specific formulations we use here are different from the ones that were originally pro-
posed by the authors of the solution concepts. The formulations used here can be found, for
example, in the work by del Pozo et al. (2011).
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ΨNRi (ν
∗) =
∑
pi∈Π(C),C⊆I\{i}
(n− |C| − 1)!
n!
(ν∗(pi(i→ |C|))− ν∗(pi))
=
∑
piS∈Ω(I),piS(i)=|S|
∆∗ν∗(piS)
|S|! . (22)
The difference between these two solution concepts is that the former distributes
the generalised dividend among all players in piS equally (and hence the require-
ment i ∈ S), whereas the latter gives the entire generalised dividend to the last
contributing player in piS (and hence the requirement pi(i) = |S|, i.e., that i is
the last player). Having defined the two solution concepts, we will now formally
define the centrality measure due to del Pozo et al. (2011), which builds upon a
parametrised hybrid of the two.
Centrality According to del Pozo et al. (2011) : The authors define a family
of solution concepts for generalised cooperative games, parametrised by α, as
follows:
Ψαi (ν
∗) =
∑
piS∈Ω(I),i∈S
∆∗ν∗(piS)
α|S|−piS(i)
|S|!∑|S|−1j=0 αj . (23)
Note that we abuse notation and assume that 00 = 1. From the above equation, it
is clear that this family of solution concepts is in fact a hybrid of Equations (21)
and (22). Specifically, when α = 0 we obtain the Nowak and Radzik (1994) value
as in Equation (22), and when α = 1 we obtain the Sanchez and Bergantin˜os
(1997) value, as in Equation (21). Between the two extremes, a smaller α implies
that a higher proportion of a dividend is gradually given to the later players in an
ordered coalition, whereas a larger α implies a more even distribution of power
regardless of the order of players.
We are almost ready to introduce the measure proposed by del Pozo et al. (2011).
The last definition we need to introduce is that of digraph-restricted games. To
this end, let νP∗D denote the game ν restricted by the digraph D, and let Paths(D)
denote the set of all paths without loops in the digraph D. We will first show how
games belonging to the unanimity basis can be restricted by digraphs (see Sec-
tion 2 for more on unanimity bases). Recall that when u∗S is a generalised charac-
teristic function for a (regular, not generalised) unanimity game for the coalition
S, then we have u∗S =
∑
piS∈Π(S) w
∗
piS
, where w∗piS is the generalised unanimity
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game for piS . The digraph restriction of the unanimity game u∗S according to del
Pozo et al., denoted by uP∗D,S , is defined as follows:
uP∗D,S =
∑
piS∈Π(S)∩Paths(D)
wpiS .
In other words, only consecutively connected ordered coalitions (i.e., those that
are paths) that contain every member of S have value 1. The general formula for
digraph restricted games not belonging to the unanimity basis, then, is as follows:
νP∗D =
∑
S∈V
∆ν(S)u
P∗
D,S,
where ∆ν(S) are the regular (not generalised) Harsanyi dividends for the cooper-
ative game ν. Note that—unlike ν—νP∗D is a generalised characteristic function.
For this reason, solution concepts for generalised cooperative games must be used
as a measure of power. Now, we are ready to present the centrality measure due
to del Pozo et al. (2011). Given a digraph D and a (regular, not generalised)
cooperative game ν, the centrality of a node v is:
Ψαv (ν
P∗
D )− SVv(ν). (24)
v1 v2 v3
v4
v5
Figure 6: A sample digraph used to compare a number of centrality measures
based on connectivity.
Example 9 Consider the directed network in Figure 6 along with the charac-
teristic function ν(C) = |C|2. Let us start by calculating the Harsanyi divi-
dends for this game. Since ν is symmetric, we will write ∆(|C|) to be equivalent
to ∆ν(C) (which will allow us to define the dividends for 5 possible coalition
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sizes, rather than for all 25 coalitions). First, we have ∆(1) = 12 = 1. Next,
∆(2) = 22 − 2∆(1) = 2. Moving on, ∆(3) = 32 − 3∆(1) − 3∆(2) = 0,
∆(4) = 42 − 4∆(1) − 6∆(2) − 4∆(3) = 0, and finally ∆(5) = 52 − 5∆(1) −
10∆(2) − 10∆(3) − 5∆(4) = 0. The Shapley value of any player is simply
∆(1)+ 4∆(2)
2
= 1+ 4
2
= 5, since every node belongs to only one coalition of size 1
and 4 coalitions of size 2. Alternatively, the value of the grand coalition is 25, and
since the game is symmetric, then this value is split equally between all players,
i.e., 25
5
= 5 each.
We will now express νP∗D given the digraph D from Figure 6. We have ν
P∗
D (piC) =∑
S⊆V ∆ν(S)u
P∗
D,S(piC). Recall that u
P∗
D,S(piC) = 1 if and only if piC is a path
in D and C contains all the players from S. Since the Harsanyi dividends are
equal to 0 for all coalitions of size greater than 2, our job is not too difficult.
νP∗D (piC) = |C| + 2 × [number of paths in D of length 2 in piC ]. In terms of the
unanimity basis for generalised cooperative games, we have: νP∗D = w
∗
{1}+w
∗
{2}+
w∗{3} + w
∗
{4} + w
∗
{5} + 2× [w∗{1,2} + w∗{2,3} + w∗{3,4} + w∗{5,3}]. This form of νP∗D is
very convenient, as we now have the coefficients in the unanimity basis, and hence
the dividends required to calculate the new centrality.
The Nowak-Radzik value vector for the nodes v1, v2, v3, v4, v5 is therefore 1, 2, 3, 2, 1,
whereas Sanchez-Bergantios value vector is 1.5, 2, 2.5, 1.5, 1.5, and the centrality
due to del Pozo et al. (2011) is simply a shift of these values by −5. Note that the
sum of the centralities is equal for both solution concepts; only the distribution
has changed. We can now see how important the edges and their direction is for
the Nowak-Radzik value. For example, the benefit of the edge v3 → v4 is split
equally between nodes v3 and v4 in the Sanchez-Bergantios value, however in the
Nowak-Radzik value v3 gains nothing from it, and the entire worth of the edge is
given to the last node—v4.
The complexity of this measure has not been extensively studied. The charac-
terisation of the centrality measure given by del Pozo et al. (2011) requires the
calculation of all Harsanyi dividends for all paths in the graph. A naive algo-
rithm would have to traverse all paths without loops in a graph, possibly resulting
in O(
∑n
k=1
(
n
k
)
k!) calculations. Furthermore, calculating all Harsanyi dividends
requires O(
∑n
k=1
(
n
k
)
2k) calculations. It is an open problem whether these com-
plexities can be improved upon in general or for certain classes of graphs.
One criticism of the above family of centrality measures is as follows: why does
it not allow—through the parameter α or otherwise—for the option of the first
nodes in a path to benefit most? It is purely by convention that we equate paths
with ordered coalitions such that the source of the path is the first node in the
coalition, and the destination is the last. This can, of course, be remedied by
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reversing the edges in the graph depending on the application, but it is not an
inherent parameter of the centrality. We will return to this question in Section 5.5;
the centrality measure presented therein does the opposite of the Nowak-Radzik
value, giving more value to nodes at the beginning of paths.
In the next section, we move on to a measure of centrality developed by Amer
et al. (2007). Although the centrality presented in this section stems from the
work by Go´mez et al. (2003), which makes prominent use of the Myerson value,
it is not in fact based on the idea of graph-restricted games according to Myerson.
The idea of digraph-restricted games presented here is somewhat convoluted, and
the result is not intuitive. The centrality in the next section, however, is based on
almost a direct translation of Myerson’s graph-restricted games to digraphs.
4.4 Accessibility in Digraphs and Centrality due to Amer et al.
(2007)
Amer et al. Amer et al. (2007) define the notion of accessibility in digraphs based
on an idea similar to Myerson’s graph-restricted games. Although they do not use
the term “centrality”, they do talk about the ranking of nodes in a network. In
essence, their notion of accessibility is a centrality measure suitable for applica-
tions in which it is important for central nodes to be reachable (i.e., accessible).
In a sense, this is the opposite of closeness centrality, where it is desirable to be
able to reach other nodes quickly from central nodes. Amer et al. (2007) define a
digraph-restricted, generalised cooperative game on a directed network, in much
the same way that Myerson defined a graph-restricted cooperative game on net-
works. The approach taken is to partition ordered coalitions into a maximal set
of smaller ordered coalitions that form paths in the digraph, and to equate their
value with the sum of the values of these maximal coalitions. Formally, let Π(V )
be the set of all permutations on a set of nodes, V . Furthermore, let pi ∈ Π(V )
be a permutation of V and denote by pi(j) the position of node j in pi, and by
pij the j’th element in pi. Next, we must introduce connected consecutive sub-
coalitions of pi according to a digraph D. We say pi = {pip, pip+1, . . . , pip+u}
is such a coalition whenever (pij, pij+1) ∈ E(D). Additionally, if p = 1 or
(pip−1, pi(p)) 6∈ E(D), then pi cannot be expanded to the left. If p + u = |V |
or (pi(p + u), pi(p + u + 1)) 6∈ E(D), then pi cannot be expanded to the right. If
pi cannot be expanded to the left nor to the right, then it is a maximal connected
consecutive subcoalition. We denote by pi/D the set of maximal consecutive sub-
coalitions of pi according to D.
Let us now define the digraph-restricted generalised characteristic function of a
(regular, non-generalised) cooperative game that makes use of the above concepts.
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Recall that Equation (4)—which defines the Shapley value—considers different
permutations of players in each coalition. Now, according to Amer et al. (2007),
in the case of digraphs, the characteristic function needs to be redefined, because
some of the aforementioned permutations may not be feasible (i.e., not all of them
form paths and may therefore not be able to communicate). We will denote by
νAG∗D the generalised characteristic function obtained from restricting ν by the
digraph D. For an ordered coalition, piS ∈ Π(S), we define:
νAG∗D (piS) =
∑
piC∈piS/D
ν(C). (25)
Note that νAG∗D is defined over ordered coalitions, as opposed to ν, which is de-
fined over unordered coalitions.
The authors used these digraph-restricted games to characterise the accessibility
of a node in much the same way as Myerson can be equated to the Shapley value of
the graph-restricted game. The accessibility of a node v in the digraph D with the
cooperative game ν, ACv(D; ν) is defined as the Nowak-Radzik value (as defined
in the previous section) of the digraph-restricted game:
ACv(D; ν) =
1
|V |!
∑
pi∈Π(V )
[νAG∗D (pi|v ∪ v)− νAG∗D (pi|v)], (26)
where pi|v is the ordered coalition pi cut off just before the node v (i.e., if pi =
{v1, v2, . . . , vk−1, vk, v, . . . , vn}, then pi|v = {v1, v2, . . . , vk−1, vk}), and where pi∪
v is the ordered coalition with v added at the end of pi.
Example 10 Let us consider the centrality due to Amer et al. (2007) with the
characteristic function ν2(C) = |C|2 and the digraph presented in Figure 6—the
same directed graph for which we calculated the centrality due to del Pozo et al.
(2011) in the previous section. The accessibility of the nodes v1, v2, v3, v4, v5 are
1, 1.4, 1.9, 1.63, 1, respectively. One can see that the paths ending at v4 are—on
average—longer than those ending at v3. However, more short paths exist that
end at v3 than those that end at v4. To give more value to longer paths, one might
consider the game ν10(C) = |C|10. Now, the resulting ranks are 1, 205.4, 3259.9,
21430.6 and 1, respectively. The exponent—in effect—specifies the extent of the
synergy that happens when large groups collaborate. In this case, the longer paths
that end with v4 dominate the larger number of short paths ending with v3. We
saw the opposite for ν2, where synergy between nodes resulted in less value.
Accessibility satisfies the following properties:
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• Linearity: for any node, v, any pair of characteristic functions, µ and ν,
and any pair of real numbers, x and y, we have: ACv(D;xν + yµ) = x ·
ACv(D; ν) + y · ACv(D;µ);
• Dummy-player: Amer et al. (2007) use a somewhat broader definition of the
classic dummy player axiom. It is defined such that for any node v that con-
tributes exactly its singleton value to any coalition we have: ACv(D; ν) =
νAG∗D ({v});
• Average efficiency: ∑v ACv(D; ν) = 1|V |! ∑pi∈Π(V ) νAG∗D (pi);
• Given a complete digraphD (i.e., one in which all possible edges are present),
for every node v ∈ V , ACv(D;µ) coincides with the Shapley value of v in
the game (I, ν);
• If a node v is inaccessible in D (i.e., if the indegree of v equals 0), then
ACv(D; ν) = ν
AG∗
D ({v});
• For any node v in any digraph D, ACv(D; ν) does not change by adding to
D an edge from v to any other player;
• If ν is superadditive, then adding an edge from some node to the node v
does not decrease the value ACv(D;µ).
These properties, however, do not uniquely characterise the accessibility measure.
In contrast to the Shapley value, no set of axioms have yet been identified that
would fully characterise accessibility.
The accessibility centrality measure was extended by Amer et al. (2012) to some-
thing akin to that of semivalue as follows:
ACv(D; ν, φ
β) = φβv (νD) =∑
C∈V \{v}
β(|C|)(|V | − 1− |C|)!(|C|)!|V |!
∑
pi∈Π(C)
[νAG∗(pi ∪ {v})− νAG∗(pi)], (27)
where φβ is the semivalue with which the probability of a coalition of size k being
chosen is equal to β(k). Now, let us say that a game (I, ν) is zero-normalized
whenever ν({i}) = 0 for all i ∈ I . Then, the accessibility centrality measure
defined in Equation (27) satisfies the following properties:
• If ν is zero-normalized, then for every inaccessible node v (i.e., a node
whose indegree is 0), we have: ACv(D; ν, φβ) = 0;
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• For every digraph D = (V,E) and every node v ∈ V , if an edge (v, u) is
added toE, then the accessibility of v stays the same, i.e.,ACv((V,E); ν, φβ) =
ACv((V,E ∪ (v, u)); ν, φβ);
• If ν is monotonic and zero-normalized, then for every digraph D = (V,E)
and every node v ∈ V , adding an edge (u, v) will not decrease the accessi-
bility of v. That is, ACv((V,E); ν, φβ) ≤ ACv((V,E ∪ (u, v)); ν, φβ);
• Given a complete digraphD (i.e., one in which all possible edges are present),
for every node v ∈ V , ACv(D; ν, φβ) coincides with φβv (ν)—the semivalue
of v in the game (V, ν);
To date, the complexity of this measure has not been extensively studied, however
a naive algorithm would have to traverse all ordered coalitions, of which there
are O(
∑n
k=1
(
n
k
)
k!). In the next section, we discuss a recent measure of centrality
proposed by Belau (2014). As opposed to the previous measures, this centrality
is tailored for weighted networks. It makes use of the graph-restricted game by
Myerson, but in a much different manner from the centrality measures presented
up until now. This will be the last measure that we discuss that features Myerson’s
notion of connectivity.
4.5 Cohesion Centrality due to Belau (2014)
In this section we introduce cohesion centrality Belau (2014). The defining feature
of this node centrality measure is that it goes through the intermediary step of
ranking all edges in terms of their importance for the cohesion of the network.
The underlying model for this measure consists of a weighted (or unweighted)
digraph and a cooperative game on the set of nodes. From this, a new cooperative
game on the set of edges is defined, which is meant to represent how important
each set of edges is for the cohesion, or interconnectedness, of the network. Next,
either the Shapley value or the Banzhaf index is used to assess the importance for
cohesion of every edge. The rank of each edge and its weight are then combined
and—finally—one of Freeman’s Freeman (1979) measures (degree, closeness or
betweenness) is used to determine the weight of each node.
The first step of the cohesion centrality is to assign new weights to the edges in the
network D = (V,E). This is done according to the link-game Meessen (1988);
Borm et al. (1992)—νBV : 2
E → R—of a cooperative game ν : 2V → R, which is
defined as follows:
νBV (SE) := ν
M
(V,SE)
(V ),
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where SE ∈ E and νM(V,SE) is Myerson’s graph-restricted game for ν and the graph
(V, SE). In short, the link game defines a process through which we take a coop-
erative game (ν) on the set of nodes (V ), and from it define a cooperative game
(νBV ) on the set of edges (E). Myerson’s graph-restricted game is used to asses the
value of the set of all nodes (i.e., the whole network) under different subsets of
edges. The next step in defining the cohesion centrality of nodes is to use either
the Shapley value or Banzhaf index to measure the value of each edge. The weight
of the edges and their payoffs are then normalised to sum up to 1 (this is done by
dividing the payoff of each edge by |E| and its weight by the sum of all weights)
and combined according to the formula:
αω(s, t) + (1− α)φ(s,t)(νBV ),
for some parameter α and where φ(s,t) is either the Shapley value or Banzhaf
index of the edge (s, t) in the link game, and ω(s, t) is the weight of the edges
(s, t). Finally, one of the classical centralities defined by Freeman (1979) is used
to define the cohesion centrality.
v1 v2 v3
v4
v5
e1 e2
e3
e4
e5
Figure 7: A sample weighted graph used to illustrate cohesion centrality due to
Belau (2014).
Example 11 Let us consider the cohesion centrality of the nodes in Figure 7.
Recall, that in order to define the underlying model we need both a graph and
cooperative game on the set of nodes. For the latter, we will consider the co-
hesion game defined by Belau (2014), which is defined as follows: c(S,G) =∑
v∈S cv(G), where cv(G) is the number of nodes reachable from the node v in
the graph G. The link game (on the set of nodes) for this cohesion game then
follows: cBV (SE) =
∑
v∈V cv((V, SE)), where SE ⊆ E. The Shapley value of the
edges e1, e2, e3, e4, and e5 in the cohesion link game is 3.7, 3.6, 2.7, 3.7, and
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2.7, respectively. By using Freeman’s Degree Centrality with these weights, we
obtain a ranking of individual nodes. The rank of the nodes v1, v2, v3, v4, and v5
is 3.7, 10, 10, 5.4, and 3.7, respectively. We note that—if removed—v2 and v3 both
disconnect one node from the rest of the network, making them the most important
nodes for the cohesion of the network. Nodex v1 and v5 both only have one edge,
which connects them to the rest of the network, making them the least important.
Node v4, on the other hand, has two edges, but they are not particularly important
towards cohesion, making v4 not much more important than v1 or v5.
In the next section, we discuss the centrality measure due to Grofman and Owen
(1982). This centrality considers all the paths within a directed network (just
like the centralities due to del Pozo et al. (2011) and Amer et al. (2007)), but it
considers connectivity in a slightly different manner than the centrality measures
that we have discussed up until now.
4.6 Banzhaf Centrality due to Grofman and Owen (1982)
In this section we discuss the Banzhaf path-based centrality Grofman and Owen
(1982). This approach to connectivity is somewhat different than what we have
discussed thus far, as it does not involve graph-restricted games of any man-
ner. The centrality considers all connected ordered coalitions (i.e., paths without
loops), much like the centrality due to del Pozo et al. (2011), but without an ex-
plicit evaluation of groups of nodes. Rather, the authors of the measure go back to
the roots of the Banzhaf index Banzhaf (1965), which was defined as the relative
number of possible swing votes that players have in weighted voting games.
Banzhaf Index of Power for weighted voting games: The Banzhaf power index
is a very prominent solution concept in cooperative game theory. Originally pro-
posed for voting games, it is defined as the probability that a player can change
the outcome of an election. Here, we will give a slightly more general definition
for weighted voting games (the original definition is equivalent to the one below,
where all weights are equal to 1).
In a weighted voting game, players attempt to pass a motion. A coalition is con-
sidered winning, if the motion is carried. Consider a set I of n players, {1, . . . , n},
where player i has weight wi, 0 < wi ≤ 1 and
∑n
i=1 wi = 1. We define the quota,
q, with 0 < q ≤ 1, as the sum of the weights of votes that is necessary for the mo-
tion to be carried. A coalition is winning if the sum of the weights of its members
is equal to or greater than q.
A swing vote for player i is a winning coalition that contains i (i.e., i was one of
the players that voted for the motion to be carried) and his or her defection would
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change the outcome (the motion would not be carried if i left it). Let the number
of such coalitions for i be denoted by Si. The relative Banzhaf power index for
player i, Bi, is then defined as
Bi =
Si∑n
i=1 Si
. (28)
Since such an index is game-specific (i.e., it heavily depends on the number of
players), a total/normalised Banzhaf index, B′i, is defined for comparison of nodes
between games.
B′i =
Si
2n − 1 . (29)
The Banzhaf index is defined as the expected contribution of a player in a coop-
erative game.Consider the cooperative game ν for a weighted voting game such
that ν(C) = 1 if C is winning and ν(C) = 0 otherwise. Given this definition,
the Banzhaf index of ν coincides with the Banzhaf index for the weighted voting
game.
Banzhaf centrality due to Grofman and Owen (1982): The idea behind this
centrality measure is to count the number of times when a path is irreparably
broken by the removal of a node. If the removal of v from a path, pi, means that
no subset of the remaining nodes can form another path between the source and
destination nodes, then v clearly plays a significant role in pi. The number of times
a node can “break” a path in such a way determines its rank.
More formally, let us defined the winning and losing coalitions. First and fore-
most, it is important to note that Grofman and Owen (1982) consider coalitions
as ordered sets. The set of winning coalitions, then, is defined as the set of simple
paths (paths without cycles) of length 2 or greater. Thus (1, 2, 3) represents a path
from node 1 to node 3, whereas (1, 3, 2) a path from node 1 to 2. A node v has
a swing vote in a winning coalition (i.e., path) pi that visits v whenever the set of
nodes that are visited by pi without v can in no way form another path from the
source to the destination. With these definitions of swing and winning coalition,
the traditional definition of the Banzhaf power index (Equations 28 and 29) can
be applied directly.
As a critique of this approach, its connection to cooperative game theory and the
Banzhaf index is slightly forced. Why do the authors go through modifying the
original Banzhaf setting of weighted voting to networks? From a purely network
science point of view, it seems perfectly reasonable to consider the number of
paths that a node is essential to as its centrality measure and no new insight is
brought from an analogy to the Banzhaf index.
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Example 12 Consider again the nodes in Figure 7 and their Banzhaf path-based
centrality Grofman and Owen (1982). In particular, we will consider a variant of
the centrality that was proposed by the authors, where swing votes of the first and
last nodes in a path are not counted. After all, it is obvious that if the source or
destination is removed, then the other nodes will not be able to reach these nodes;
a source or destination node always has a swing vote.
Given the graph in Figure 7, the centrality of each of the nodes v1, v4 and v5 ac-
cording to Grofman and Owen (1982) is 0. Indeed, nodes v1 and v5 are simply
connected by one edge to the rest of the graph and lead nowhere else, making it
clear that they do not have a single swing vote. As for v4, it brings no indispens-
able edges to the graph. For all paths that it belongs to, it can be bypassed. In
contrast, nodes v2 and v3 have a centrality of 1224 each. This is because each of
them is indispensable for 12 paths, and there are a total of 24 swing votes. More
specifically, node v2 is indispensable to the following paths:
v1 → v2 → v3, v1 → v2 → v4 → v3,
v1 → v2 → v3 → v4, v1 → v2 → v4,
v1 → v2 → v3 → v5, v1 → v2 → v4 → v3 → v5,
v3 → v2 → v1, v3 → v4 → v2 → v1,
v4 → v3 → v2 → v1, v4 → v2 → v1,
v5 → v3 → v2 → v1, v5 → v3 → v4 → v2 → v1.
On the other hand, node v3 is indispensable to the following paths:
v4 → v3 → v5, v4 → v2 → v3 → v5,
v1 → v2 → v3 → v5, v1 → v2 → v4 → v3 → v5,
v2 → v3 → v5, v2 → v4 → v3 → v5 →,
v5 → v3 → v4, v5 → v3 → v2 → v4,
v5 → v3 → v2 → v1, v5 → v3 → v4 → v2 → v1,
v5 → v3 → v2, v5 → v3 → v4 → v2.
The complexity of computing this centrality has not been studied in the literature.
A naive algorithm considers all paths within the network (of which there are po-
tentially O(
∑n
k=1
(
n
k
)
k!)), and for each node in the path checks whether the rest
of the nodes can rearrange themselves in order to form a different path between
the same pair of nodes.
In the following section, we will discuss two other variatoions of connectivity that
have also been applied to game-theoretic network centrality.
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4.7 Connectivity Games due to Amer and Gime´nez (2004)
In approaching connectivity, Amer and Gime´nez (2004) formalised an approach
that differs from Myerson’s graph restricted games in its evaluation of discon-
nected coalitions. Whereas Myerson Myerson (1977) assumed that disconnected
coalitions cannot fully cooperate and therefore their value should be the sum of
their maximally connected parts, Amer and Gime´nez (2004) postulate that the
value of such coalitions should be 0. In line with this, Amer and Gime´nez (2004)
defined the following characteristic function of a simple game:6
νAGG (S) =
{
1 if S ∈ C(G)
0 otherwise,
(30)
where AG stands for Amer and Gimenez. The game is referred to as the 0-1-
connectivity game. This characteristic function was later generalised by Lindelauf
et al. (2013) to:
νfG(S) =
{
f(S,G) if S ∈ C(G)
0 otherwise,
(31)
where f is an arbitrary function to the real numbers, allowing for any valuation of
connected coalitions.
Amer and Gime´nez (2004) combined the game νAGG (S) with semivalues in order
to rank individual nodes in terms of their importance to connectivity. Lindelauf
et al. (2013) considered the Shapley value of νfG, although—in principle—any
other semivalue could also be used.
As a rather interesting application, Lindelauf et al. (2013) used their centrality
measure to analyse terrorist networks. However, Michalak et al. (2013b) later ar-
gued that, for terrorist networks, this centrality measure overstates the importance
of nodes for the connectivity of the network and thus is not suitable for this appli-
cation. In terms of complexity, Michalak et al. (2013b) also showed that, even for
the simplest variant of connectivity games, where ∀S∈C(G)f(S,G) = 1, comput-
ing the Shapley value of νfG is #P-Complete and therefore not tractable for larger
networks.
In the next section based on connectivity, we discuss an alternative (and in some
respects more sophisticated) notion of connectivity for game-theoretic payoff allo-
cation in directed networks, which was introduced by Kim and Tackseung (2008).
6Simple coalitional games are a popular class of games, where every coalition has a value of
either 1 or 0.
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4.8 Weak Connectivity due to Kim and Tackseung (2008)
Kim and Tackseung Kim and Tackseung (2008) introduce the notion of weak con-
nectivity, and use it to develop a payoff division scheme (that can be interpreted
as a centrality measure) that is similar to the Myerson value. In fact, this divi-
sion scheme is equal to the Myerson value if the network is undirected. However,
rather than requiring a path between any pair of nodes (i.e., strong connectivity),
weak connectivity attempts to account for the fact that a single node in a digraph
can “gather” the information from within a coalition. Such a node (which need
not be unique) is referred to by the authors as the informational coordinator. Let
E∗ be the relation that represents the transitive closure of the relation defined by
the edges of a digraph, D(V,E). In other words, we have E∗(s, t) if and only if
there exists a path from s to t. For C ⊆ V , if there exists a node v ∈ C such
that for all nodes u ∈ C we have E∗(u, v) (i.e., v is an informational coordinator),
then we say that C is weakly connected. By C/E we denote the set of weakly
connected components of C ∈ V and define it as the coarsest partition of C into
weakly connected sets (i.e., such that no two weakly connected sets can be joined
to form an even larger weakly connected set). Note that this partition need not be
unique. If the partition is unique, then the authors define digraph restricted games
in the following manner:
νKTD (S) =
∑
C∈S/E
ν(C).
When the partition is not unique, the value of the digraph restricted game is de-
fined as the maximum value over all partitions:
νKTD (S) = max
S/E∈KT (S)
[
∑
C∈S/E
ν(C)],
whereKT (S) denotes the set of all possible partitions of the set S into maximally
weakly connected components. Next, the authors used the following allocation
rule:
φKTi (ν) = SVi(ν
KT
D ).
When the network in question is undirected, then weak connectivity and strong
connectivity are equivalent. Therefore, for undirected networks, this allocation is
equal to the Myerson value. Its complexity for undirected networks is therefore
also the same as that of the Myerson value. For directed networks, however, it is
potentially worse (although this has not been studied in the literature to date).
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Not weakly connected Weakly connected components
{1, 3} {1}, {3}
{1, 4} {1}, {4}
{2, 4} {2}, {4}
{1, 2, 4} {1, 2}, {4}
{1, 3, 4} {1}, {3, 4}
{1, 5} {1}, {5}
{2, 5} {2}, {5}
{1, 2, 5} {1, 2}, {5}
{1, 3, 5} {1}, {3, 5}
{4, 5} {4}, {5}
{1, 4, 5} {1}, {4}, {5}
{2, 4, 5} {2}, {4}, {5}
{1, 2, 4, 5} {1, 2}, {4}, {5}
{1, 3, 4, 5} {1}, {3, 4, 5}
Table 2: The breakdown of the not weakly connected subgraphs of {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}
in Figure 6 into weakly connected components
Example 13 Consider again Figure 6 and the characteristic function ν(C) =
|C|2. There are 31 non-empty subsets of the set {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}. Of these, 17 are
weakly connected. As for the other 14 subsets, they are listed in Table 2 along
with their weakly connected components. In this case, all of the partitions are
unique. None of these subgraphs (except for singletons) would be considered
connected in the classical sense, since we never have a situation where every
node can communicate with every other node.
The centralities of the nodes v1, v2, v3, v4, and v5 according to Kim and Tackseung
(2008) are 7.36667, 8.5, 9.33333, 7.46667, and 7.46667, respectively.
In the next section, we discuss an axiomatic approach to connectivity due to Skib-
ski et al. (2016b). This will also be the last centrality based on connectivity that
we discuss.
4.9 Attachment Centrality due to Skibski et al. (2016b)
Skibski et al. (2016b) developed an axiomatic approach to study connectivity in
networks. In particular, they postulated the following axioms for a connectivity-
based centrality measure:
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• Locality: The centrality of a node depends only on its connected compo-
nent. In other words, let C be the connected component of v in some graph
G. Then the centrality of v in G should be the same as its centrality in the
subgraph of G induced by C, G[C]
• Normalisation: The centrality of any node is inbetween the values 0 and
|V | − 1, inclusive.
• Fairness: If we add an edge (u, v) to G, then the magnitude of the resulting
change to the centrality of u is equal to the magnitude of the change to
the centrality of v. This is the same axiom that is used to characterise the
Myerson value.
• Gain-loss: Adding any edge to any connected graph, G, will not change the
sum of the centralities of the nodes.
The authors show that these four axioms uniquely characterise the following cen-
trality, which they call attachment centrality:
Av(G) =
∑
S∈V \{v}
2β(S, V )(|K(C)| − |K(C ∪ {v})|+ 1),
where β(S, V ) = |S|!(|V |−|S|−1)!|V |! and K(C) is the set of components of G[C], the
subgraph induced by C. The authors also note that Av(G) is equal to the Shapley
value of the following game:
ν(C) = 2(|C| − |K(C)|)
In this, the approach of the authors to centrality based on connectivity is similar
to Myerson, whereby it is defined by a set of axioms. This is highly desirable,
since the axioms intuitively identify the centrality and therefore help identify those
contexts where it is best to apply it.
With this, we conclude our review of centrality measures based on connectivity.
In the next section, we discuss those that are not.
5 Game-Theoretic Node Centrality Measures Not Based
on Connectivity
The second general approach to game-theoretic network centrality places empha-
sis on choosing a characteristic function that evaluates the role of nodes according
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to their topological position and combining this with some solution concept for
normal cooperative games (without networks). In this approach, the connectivity
of nodes does not need to have any direct bearing on their centrality, although this
can still be expressed in the choice of the characteristic function. The general idea
behind most of the centrality measures discussed in this section is to take some
group centrality measure and treat it as a cooperative game on the set of nodes.
Next, solution concepts such as the Shapley value, semivalues or others are used
in conjunction with group centrality measures in order to yield a ranking of nodes.
This section is structured as follows. In Section 5.1, we discuss the work by
van den Brink and Borm (1994) and the follow-up work by van den Brink and
Gilles (2000), who defined a group centrality that reflects the dominance of groups
of nodes in directed graphs, and then proposed a Shapley value-based centrality
that captures synergies within the network. This idea was rediscovered by Rama-
suri and Narahari (2008) for the application of information diffusion and influence
propagation, and was extended by Michalak et al. (2013a) to a broader range of
group centrality measures. Both publications are discussed in Section 5.2, where
Shapley value degree and Shapley value closeness centrality measures are dis-
cussed. Michalak et al. (2013a) developed polynomial algorithms for computing
these—and other—game-theoretic centrality measures. Continuing, in Section 5.3
we discuss the work by Szczepan´ski et al. (2012), who proposed the Shapley value
betweenness centrality and also developed polynomial-time algorithms for calcu-
lating it. In Section 5.4, we discuss a generalisation of the Shapley value approach
to centrality that was developed by Szczepan´ski et al. (2014). This approach,
which is based on the Owen value, applies to networks that have an extraneously
defined community structure. Finally, in Section 5.5 we discuss the VL control
measure, which shares some, but not all aspects of the other centrality measures
discussed in this section.
5.1 Centrality Based on Dominance due to van den Brink and
Borm (1994)
van den Brink and Borm (1994) and van den Brink and Gilles (2000) propose
a measure of dominance in directed networks called the β-measure.7 Although
this measure was apparently not intended to be game-theoretic in nature, the au-
thors show that it coincides with the Shapley value of the score game in networks
(which is a generalisation of the so-called score measure). Moreover, the authors
axiomatically characterize both the β-measure and score measure. Although it
7A preliminary version of this article appeared as a working paper van den Brink and Borm
(1994) and was later on extended by van den Brink and Borm (2002).
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is not stated explicitly as such, the β-measure can be interpreted as a measure of
centrality in networks. The remainder of this section formally introduces the score
measure, the score game, and—finally—the β-measure.
In the context of this section, a directed network is interpreted as a representation
of the dominance between nodes, whereby a directed edge (v, u) represents the
fact that v dominates u. Let E(v) = {u : (v, u) ∈ D} denote the set of nodes
dominated by s, and let E−1(v) = {u : (u, v) ∈ D} denote the set of nodes that
dominate v. The score measure, then, is a function, σD : V → N that assigns
to every node, v ∈ V , the number of nodes that are dominated by v (i.e., the
outdegree of v). Formally:
σD(v) = |ED(v)| .
This measure is well known in the literature and mentioned, for example, by Be-
hzad et al. (1979). It is typically used to rank participants in a tournament, where
a tournament is defined as an irreflexive digraph where for all u, v ∈ V such that
u 6= v it holds that either (u, v) ∈ D or (v, u) ∈ D. van den Brink and Gilles
(2000) axiomatically characterized this measure, showing that it uniquely satisfies
the following properties or axioms:
• Score normalisation: For every digraph, D, the sum of the scores of all
nodes add up to |E|.
• Dummy-node: If v does not dominate any node, its score is 0;
• Symmetry: For any u, v ∈ V such that ED(u) = ED(v) and E−1D (u) =
E−1D (v), the score of u is equal to the score of v;
• Additivity over independent partitions: The sum of the scores of nodes in
D is equal to the sum of the scores of nodes in the subgraphs generated by
all the independent partitions of D (where independent partition are such
that for any node u, if the set of nodes that dominates u is non-empty, then
all of the nodes dominating u belong to the same part in the partition), the
score of any node v is the sum of the values that v receives in each part in
the partition.
Inspired by the score measure, van den Brink and Borm (1994) introduced the
score game of a digraph D, which is a cooperative game with the set V of play-
ers and the characteristic function—νBBD —that generalises the score measure as
follows:
νBBD (C) =
∣∣EBBD (C)∣∣ ,
46
where EBBD (C) =
⋃
v∈C ED(v) (note that E
BB
D (C) may or may not contain mem-
bers of C). In a sense, this is a version of group degree centrality for digraphs,
where the out-degree of a coalition determines its score. Note, however, that for a
coalition of nodes C, whereas group out-degree centrality does not usually count
the out-neighbours of the members of C that also belong to C towards its value,
the score game does.
Finally, the β-measure can be defined as the Shapley value of the score game.
Equivalently, the authors show that for every node v in D, we have:
βv(D) = SVv(ν
BB
D ) =
∑
u∈ED(v)
1
|E−1D (u)|
.
Intuitively, the measure indicates that a reward of 1 is given for dominating any
node. If a node, v, is dominated by multiple nodes, then this reward is equally
distributed among all of the nodes that dominate it. van den Brink and Gilles
(2000) axiomatically characterize their β-measure by the properties: dummy-
node, symmetry, additivity over independent partitions, and dominance normali-
sation. Whereas we are familiar with the first four axioms, dominance normalisa-
tion is defined as follows:
• Dominance normalisation: For every digraph D, the sum of the scores of
all players is equal to the number of players that are each dominated by at
least one node (i.e., have an in-degree that is not equal to 0).
As a criticism of this axiomatisation, we note that it axiomatises a dominance
relation through the use of axioms that inherently account for dominance. In this,
the axiomatisation adds little new insight into understanding the measure. To
compute the β-measure of a node v, first the sets EBBD (v) and |E−1D (u)| must be
computed for any node u dominated by v. This can be done in O(|V | + |E|)
time. van den Brink and Gilles (2000) later generalise the score measure and β-
measure for weighted digraphs, however they do not show any link between these
generalised measures and cooperative game-theory.
5.2 The Top-k Nodes Problem and the Sphere of Influence
In this section, we review various versions of Shapley value degree and closeness
centrality. The one thing that these centrality measures have in common is that
they were proposed in order to model the sphere of influence of nodes. Following
van den Brink and Borm (1994), the second game-theoretic centrality based on
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degree was proposed by Ramasuri and Narahari (2008). The authors consider a
cooperative game where the characteristic function is defined by the group degree
centrality of each coalition. In other words, the value of a coalition of nodes is
equal to the number of neighbours of this coalition. Next, the authors propose to
use the Shapley value of this game as a centrality measure. Michalak et al. (2013a)
follow by introducing a slightly different variant of a cooperative game based on
degree centrality. In particular, the value of a coalition is equal to the size of its
“fringe” set, which is defined as the set of its members and neighbours. Formally,
the “fringe” of a subset C ⊆ V is defined as follows:
fringe(C) =
{
v ∈ V : (v ∈ C) or (∃u ∈ C : (u, v) ∈ E)} .
Building upon this, the authors define the following group centrality measure
g1(C) = |fringe(C)|. (32)
We see that this approach is very similar to the one introduced in the previous
section. Just like van den Brink and Borm (1994) and Ramasuri and Narahari
(2008), Michalak et al. (2013a) use the Shapley value of this game as a central-
ity measure. In terms of computation, whereas Ramasuri and Narahari (2008)
approximated their centrality measure using Monte Carlo techniques, Michalak
et al. (2013a) developed polynomial algorithms for the computation of the Shap-
ley value of any node given the game g1. Michalak et al. (2013a) proposed four
additional centrality measures, which correspond to the Shapley values of nodes
in the following games:
• g(k)2 : This game is inspired by the general-threshold model introduced by
Kempe et al. (2005). It is parameterized by a threshold value—k—and the
general idea is that the value of a coalition is equal to the number of players
that are either in C or have at least k neighbors in C. In a sense, whereas g1
assumes that controlling any neighbour of a node, v, is sufficient to control
v, g(k)2 assumes that at least k neighbours of v must be controlled in order to
influence it. Formally, g(k)2 (G)(C) = |{v ∈ V : (v ∈ C) or (|E(v) ∩ C| ≥
k)}|.
• g3 : Unlike the previous games, g3 is defined over weighted graphs. Under
this game, the value of a coalition, C, is equal to the number of nodes that
are within a certain “cutoff distance” from C. Formally, g3(G)(C) = |{v ∈
V : dist(v, C) ≤ dcutoff )}|. Intuitively, the cutoff distance can be inter-
preted as the “radius” within which any node can influence other nodes. We
note that g1 is a special case of g3, where dcutoff = 1 and the weight of each
edge is 1.
48
Game Complexity Accuracy
g1 O(|V |+ |E|) exact
g
(k)
2 O(|V |+ |E|) exact
g3 O(|V ||E|+ |V |2log|V |) exact
g4 O(|V ||E|+ |V |2log|V |) exact
g5 O(|V ||E|) approx.
Table 3: Games considered by Michalak et al. (2013a) and their computational
results.
• g4 : According to this game, the value of a coalition C is the sum over
all nodes not belonging to C of a positive-valued, non-increasing func-
tion, f : R → R of the distances from C to those nodes.TOMASZTODO
In other words, this is exactly the generalised form of group closeness,
ψCLf (G)(S), discussed in Section 2. We note that g3 is a special case of
g4 where f(dist(v, C)) = 1 if dist(v, C) ≥ dcutoff , and f(dist(v, C)) = 0
otherwise.
• g5 : This game is also defined over weighted graphs, but unlike g3 and g4,
the weight of an edge is not interpreted as its length, but rather its power
of influence. The influence of a coalition, C, on a node, v, is defined as
the sum of all influences induced upon v by the members of C. Now, for
every node v, let us introduce a threshold, Wcutoff (v), that is necessary to
influence it. The value of a coalition,C, is then equal to the number of nodes
that are either in C or are influenced by C. Formally, ν5(C) = |{v ∈ V :
(v ∈ C) or (∑u∈C ω(u, v) ≥ Wcutoff (v))}|, where ω(u, v) is the weight
of the edge between u and v. Note that g(k)2 is a special case of g5 where
Wcutoff (v) = k for all v ∈ V and ω(u, v) = 1 for all (u, v) ∈ E.
Michalak et al. (2013a) proposed exact and efficient algorithms for computing the
Shapley value-based centrality measures based on g1 to g4. As for the Shapley
value of g5, the authors propose an approximation algorithm. A summary of the
computational complexity of their algorithms for computing the Shapley value of
the five games is presented in Table 3. Additionally, the authors evaluate the effec-
tiveness of their algorithms on two real-life networks: an infrastructure network
that represents the topology of the Western States Power Grid and a collaboration
network from the field of astrophysics.
Ramasuri and Narahari (2010) considered another characteristic function for the
application of information diffusion. In order to express the fact that information
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has reached a node, we will say that a node has been activated. Once a node has
been activated, it can share this information with its neighbors. These types of
situations can appear in ad campaigns, social networks or politics. Within this
context, Ramasuri and Narahari (2010) are concerned with determining which
nodes are the most important in disseminating information.
To model dissemination of information, Ramasuri and Narahari (2010) base their
characteristic function on the number of activated nodes in the Linear Threshold
model. Next, the Shapley value is used as a measure of centrality. The Linear
Threshold model consists of a weighted graph with active and/or inactive nodes,
each of which has a threshold value. Nodes are activated in iterative fashion by
their neighbors provided that the sum of the weights of an inactive node’s neigh-
bors surpasses its threshold value. The value of a coalition according to the char-
acteristic function is then defined to be the number of active nodes in a graph after
information has been disseminated in so many rounds, such that another itera-
tion would yield no more active nodes. Ramasuri and Narahari (2010) use Monte
Carlo approximations in order to compute this centrality.
Matejczyk et al. (2014) study the appropriateness of the Shapley value to the influ-
ence maximisation problem. They propose two new game-theoretic algorithms for
this problem: the discount Shapley value algorithm and a refinement of the Local
Directed Acyclic Graph (LDAG) algorithm. They conclude that the greedy LDAG
algorithm is currently the best solution, however their Shapley value LDAG algo-
rithm works almost as well and can be implemented in a parallel map-reduce
fashion. Moreover, the Shapley value LDAG algorithm produces a larger cover
(i.e., the set of nodes that is influenced) than any other previously studied game-
theoretic solution.
We have now surveyed various models of domination and information diffusion
and game-theoretic centrality measures that account for it. In doing so, we intro-
duced three variations of Shapley value degree centrality van den Brink and Borm
(1994); Ramasuri and Narahari (2008); Michalak et al. (2013a) and a generalised
Shapley value closeness centrality (based on g4). The natural next step is to ap-
ply the Shapley value to group betweenness centrality, which presents a useful
measure of network flow. We address this in the next section.
5.3 The Shapley Value Betweenness Centrality due to Szczepan´ski
et al. (2012)
In the previous section we introduced game-theoretic network centrality measures
that were developed by applying the Shapley value to variations of both group
degree centrality and group closeness centrality. In this section, we introduce the
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Shapley value betweenness centrality, which was proposed by Szczepan´ski et al.
Szczepan´ski et al. (2012, 2016).
Formally, the centrality is defined as the Shapley value for the cooperative game
defined by group betweenness centrality, νB, which we defined in Section 2.
Szczepan´ski et al. (2012) show the centrality can be reformulated as follows:
SVv(νB) =
∑
s 6=v
∑
t6=v
(
σs,t(v)
σs,tdist(s, t)
+
2− dist(s, v)
2dist(s, v)
)
, (33)
where σs,t is the number of shortest paths in the graph G between the nodes s and
t, and σs,t(v) is the number of those paths that contain v. The authors show that
this formulation naturally leads to a polynomial algorithm for the computation of
their centrality measures.
v1
v2
v4
v6
v8
v3
v5
v7
v9
(a)
v1
v2
v4
v6
v8
v3
v5
v7
v9
(b)
Figure 8: Two sample networks showing one of the difficulties with node central-
ity in digraphs. Depending on the application, any nodes could be considered as
“central.”
Example 14 Consider Figure 8 (a) and (b). Some of the centrality measures
we have seen thus far would place most importance on either the outer nodes
(v3, v5, v7 and v9) or the inner node (v1). Both the standard betweenness centrality
and its Shapley value extension, however, place most emphasis on the intermedi-
ary nodes—v2, v4, v6, v8. In fact, the central and outer nodes in the networks all
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have centrality 0 according to standard and Shapley value betweenness central-
ity, since none of them are intermediary nodes in any paths. Consider also the
Banzhaf path-based centrality due Grofman and Owen (1982), which considers
a coalition “winning” when it forms a simple path, and focuses on players that
have “swing” votes (i.e., whose removal makes it impossible for the two ends of
the path to communicate). Since all the possible paths in Figure 8 (a) and (b)
are shortest paths, the Banzhaf path-based centrality Grofman and Owen (1982)
will result in the exact same ranking as betweenness centrality (assuming that the
beginning and end nodes of a path are not allowed to have swing votes).
In the next section, we discuss a generalisation of the centrality measures from
this section that considers a more complex setting, where nodes belong to com-
munities.
5.4 The Owen Value-based Centrality due to Szczepan´ski et al.
(2014)
In this section we discuss the work of Szczepan´ski et al. Szczepan´ski et al. (2014),
who developed the first measure of centrality that takes into account the commu-
nity structure of the underlying network. The measure is based on a generalisation
of the Shapley value known as the Owen value—a well-known solution concept
from cooperative game theory that focuses on games with a priori-given unions
(i.e., cooperative arrangements) of players. Moreover, the authors develop a class
of solution concepts that they call coalitional semivalues, which are a generalisa-
tion of the Owen value and semivalues. We refer the reader to Section 2, where
we introduced these concepts.
Szczepan´ski et al. (2014) propose to use coalitional semivalues in combination
with group degree centrality as a measure of centrality in graphs with a community
structure. Much like in the general Shapley-value approach used by Ramasuri and
Narahari (2008) and Michalak et al. (2013a), coalitional semivalues can be used to
modify classical centrality measures to account for synergies. The authors provide
a polynomial algorithm to compute their measure.
The main advantage of this approach is that it takes into account the additional
information afforded by the community structure in determining the centrality of
nodes. The authors argue that the community to which a node belongs should
also impact its centrality. That is, if a node’s community is weak, then this should
impact the centrality of the node negatively, and if it is strong, then it should im-
pact it positively. In particular, the authors use their centrality measure to analyse
a coauthorship network, where communities are identified by the various venues
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(journals, conferences, etc.) where the nodes (i.e., authors) have published. The
main advantage of the Owen value approach is that it accounts for the fact that
being a top contributor to weak venues does not necessarily make one a good
researcher, whereas having fewer publications in top venues may be more advan-
tageous. We discuss this further in Section 6.
Building upon the Owen value, Tarkowski et al. (2016) introduce a new class of
solution concepts for cooperative games with overlapping community structures
and combine them with general group closeness centrality to develop a robust
and general centrality measure for graphs where the communities of nodes can
overlap.
The next section introduces the last measure from the literature—the VL Control
Measure, as introduced by Hendrickx et al. (2009). Although this measure also fo-
cuses on synergies, it does so in a much different manner than the other measures
in this section.
5.5 VL Control Measure for symmetric networks due to Hen-
drickx et al. (2009)
In this section, we discuss the VL control measure (where VL stands for Vorobev
Liapounov) due to Hendrickx et al. (2009). This measure—much like those sur-
veyed in Section 5.2—also has applications in influence propagation and infor-
mation diffusion. To illustrate the measure, let us analyse a fictitious context
considered by the authors. Imagine that some amount of a noxious substance is
hidden in the nodes of a network. The object is to eliminate all of the substance.
To do so, a searcher assigns xv resources to each node v, with the constraint that∑
v∈V xv = 1. That is, the searcher has 1 unit of resource that can be freely di-
vided up among the nodes. The probability of finding the substance at any given
node v is yv = xv +
∑
(v,u)∈E xu. That is, resources can search for the noxious
substance in the node they are assigned to and in its neighbors. The probability
of removing all of the substance, then, is
∏
v∈V yv. Alternatively, we can think
of allocating resources in order to spread information in a network, or any simi-
lar setting. Finally, the VL control measure of a given node, v, is the amount of
resources that needs to be placed at v according to the strategy that maximises
the probability of removing all of the substance. In other words, the centrality of
nodes is the solution to the maximisation problem max(
∏
v∈v yv) with the con-
straints yv = xv +
∑
(v,u)∈E xu for all v,
∑
v∈V xv = 1 and ∀v∈vxv ≥ 0. By
placing resources to appropriate nodes we want to maximise the probability that
all of the substance will be removed, while staying within the restrictions of the
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problem (e.g., not using more resources than we have at our disposal). Note that
this solution need not be unique.
Example 15 Consider the nodes in Figure 7. First, let us think how we can raise
the probability of removing all of the substance up from 0. Putting any amount of
resources at any one node will not suffice to achieve this. Clearly, then, resources
must be placed in at least 2 nodes. Moreover, placing any resources at v1 or v5
makes no sense, since a better effect can be achieved by placing the resources in
nodes v2 or v3, respectively (since they additionally cover v4). The answer we
need is the solution to the maximisation problem r2 ∗ (r2 + r3 + r4) ∗ (r2 + r3 +
r4)∗ (r2 +r3 +r4)∗r3 subject to
∑5
i=1 ri = 1, where ri is the amount of resources
placed in node vi (we have already informally established that r1 = 0 and r5 = 0).
Again, we can correctly surmise that no resources should be placed in v4, since
placing them in v2 or v3 would achieve the same effect while also protecting v1
and v5. The answer to the problem, then, is placing half of the resource in v2, and
the other half in v3, yielding a centrality ranking vector of 0, 0.5, 0.5, 0, 0.
At first glance, it does not look like this measure has anything to do with coopera-
tive game theory. However, the centrality of each node according to this measure
turns out to be a proper Shapley value of the game ν(S) = |{v ∈ S : E(v) ⊆ S}|,
i.e., the number of nodes in a coalition that do not have connections to nodes out-
side of it. The Harsanyi dividends for this game are easily expressed as follows:
∆ν(S) = |{v ∈ S : E(v) = S}|. To continue, we will introduce the weighted
Shapley value, which will lead us to the definition of the proper Shapley value.
The Weighted and Proper Shapley Values: Harsanyi Dividends can be used to
develop a payoff division scheme, where the value is not shared equally among
players. One such division scheme is called the weighted Shapley value. In this
payoff division scheme, it is possible to give more importance to certain players
(i.e., to disregard the Symmetry axiom). The idea is that a weight is assigned to
every player through a weight vector ω = {ω1, ω2, . . . , ωi, . . . , ωn}, where ωi is
the weight of player i.8 The weighted Shapley value with weight vector ω is then:
SV ωi (ν) =
∑
C∈{C:C⊆I and i∈C}
ωi∑
j∈C ωj
∆ν(C). (34)
Whenever for all players i ∈ I the case is that SV ωi (ν) = ωi, then SV ωi (ν) is
referred to as a Proper Shapley value for ν.
8Note that the weights do not need to sum up to 1, since the weighted Shapley value considers
the relative power of players in every coalition in accordance with the weights. For example, for
the coalition C = {2, 3, 5}, player 2 would be assigned ω2ω2+ω3+ω5 power, player 3 would be
assigned ω3ω2+ω3+ω5 power and player 5 would be assigned
ω5
ω2+ω3+ω5
power.
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Equivalence of the concepts: The equivalence of the maximisation problem to
the proper Shapley value was showed by Vorob’ev and Liapounov (1998). In
particular, the authors showed that the solution to the following maximisation
problem is a proper Shapley value of ν:
max
x∈SI
∏
S⊆I
(
∑
j∈S
xj)
∆ν(S),
where SI is the unit simplex and xj is the j’th element of the vector x. This can
be rewritten as:
max
∏
S⊆I
(
∑
j∈S
xj)
∆ν(S),
n∑
i=1
xi ≤ 1,
∀i∈Ixi ≥ 0.
For the game ν this can be applied as follows:
max
x∈SN
∏
S⊆N
(
∑
j∈S
xj)
|{i∈S:E(i)⊆S}|,
which is equivalent to the maximisation problem:
max
x∈SI
∏
i∈I
∑
j∈E(i)
xj,
which is the VL control measure that we introduced at the beginning of this sec-
tion.
Unfortunately, Bellare and Rogaway (1995) showed that there is no polynomial
algorithm for non-linear programming even for a quadratic polynomial unless
P = NP. Moreover, there is no polynomial time approximation for this prob-
lem (even with a very poor guarantee) unless P = NP. However, even though the
VL control measure can be reduced to an instance of a nonlinear programming
problem, the actual computational complexity of the VL control measure has yet
to be extensively studied.
Example 16 Consider now Figure 9. We reach a fundamental question for cen-
trality in directed networks: in which of these networks (all of which are “stars”)
is the center node—v1—central? The answer is usually straightforward in the
undirected graph (a). Both del Pozo et al. (2011) and Hendrickx et al. (2009)
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Figure 9: Three sample networks showing one of the difficulties with node cen-
trality in digraphs. Most centrality measures agree that v1 is the most central node
in network (a). However, if a centrality measure admits that node v1 is central in
network (b), then it should not be central in (c) (and vice versa).
(with a strictly convex game), for example, agree that v1 should be the most cen-
tral node. However, if we assume that v1 is the most central in digraph (b) (as it is
according to Hendrickx et al. (2009)), then we require central nodes to be able to
travel, or send information to other nodes in the network. For this same reason, v1
cannot be the most central node in digraph (c). On the other hand, if we assume
v1 to be the most central node in digraph (c) (as it would be according to del Pozo
et al. (2011)), then our application requires central nodes to be reachable from
other nodes in the network. Clearly, then, v1 cannot be the most central node in
digraph (b), since no other node can reach it.
5.6 A More General Model
Whereas the focus of most work has been the computation of a single solu-
tion concept for a single group centrality, Szczepan´ski et al. (2015b) present a
generic framework for defining group centralities. If the group centrality is de-
fined within this framework, any semivalue can be computed in polynomial time
using a generic algorithm proposed by the authors. Interestingly, the framework
also facilitates the complexity analysis and the development of algorithms for
classes of group centrality measures (e.g., parametrised measures) at once, rather
than analysing every measure individually.
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6 Applications
One weakness of the literature on game-theoretic network centrality is that it has
not been applied very extensively. This is perhaps due to a lack of algorithms
proposed and the computational difficulties inherent in the field. We list below
a few of the applications for which game-theoretic network centrality has been
used.
Ramasuri and Narahari (2008) apply their Shapley value-based degree centrality
to a co-authorship network of 8361 high-energy Physics researchers. They show
that their centrality for the top-k nodes problem achieved better results than a
well-known algorithm from the literature—the maximum degree heuristic.
Skibski et al. (2014) and Michalak et al. (2015b) use the Myerson value in order to
identify key nodes in terrorist networks. The authors argue that this helps under-
stand the hierarchy of such organisations and can facilitate efficient deployment
of investigation resources.
Szczepan´ski et al. (2014) applied their Owen value degree centrality to a citation
network. The unique feature of this approach is that it is able to take into account
the importance of the community to which a node belongs in evaluating its cen-
trality. Unfortunately, however, the method cannot be applied when nodes belong
to more than one community (i.e., communities overlap). The citation network
that was studied consists of 2 084 055 publications and 2 244 018 citation rela-
tionships. A total of 22 954 unique communities representing journals, conference
proceedings or single book titles were identified by the authors by using basic text
mining techniques. The authors found that the Owen value-based degree central-
ity has a significant advantage over other centralities in ranking the authors. This
is shown through a comparison to two other centrality measures—weighted de-
gree centrality and Shapley value-based degree centrality. The authors show that
some nodes are significantly less powerful according to the Owen value centrality,
since the communities to which they belong are weak. They argued that the Owen
value-based centrality is able to account for the fact that being a strong author in
only weak journals does not make one a strong author in general.
Szczepan´ski et al. (2016) proposed to use semivalue betweenness centrality in
order to protect networks. The idea is that random node failures may close lines of
communication in a network, and semivalues can help rank nodes in terms of how
important it is to protect them. They find that their methods perform favourably
when compared to a number of other centrality measures.
Matejczyk et al. (2014) use the Shapley value and Banzhaf index on games with
networks to solve the top-k nodes problem. They find that their method performs
comparatively (although a little worse) to the state-of-the-art.
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Keinan et al. Keinan et al. (2004) use the Shapley value in order to rank how
important sections of the brain are for certain cognitive functions. Given the com-
plex interactions between sections of the brain, they argue that the Shapley value
can account for the synergies achieved by them.
Skibski et al. Skibski et al. (2016a) proposed the first game-theoretic centrality
measure that is based on the extension of the Shapley value to games with exter-
nalities Skibski et al. (2017b) and advocated its usefulness to the analysis of the
well-known board game of Diplomacy.
Michalak et al. Michalak et al. (2015a) argue that game-theoretic centralities can
be considered as novel measures of social capital that address two key deficien-
cies of standard measures. Firstly, while the standard measures focus separately
on various types of social capital (e.g., on either individual or group social capi-
tal), game-theoretic centralities (e.g., those based on the Owen value) can be used
to measure interactions between such different types of social capital. Secondly,
network-based standard social capital measures focus solely on the network topol-
ogy; hence, they do not take into account various additional information about the
nodes, groups and connections between them. In contrast, such additional infor-
mation can be embodied in the characteristic function upon which game-theoretic
centralities are built upon.
Game-theoretic centralities become power indices when applied to weighted vot-
ing games restricted by a graph. For instance, the Myerson value is the extension
of the Shapley-Shubik index to graph-restricted weighted voting games. It is ar-
gued that restricted weighted voting games better model reality as we cannot ex-
pect that cooperation of any subset of political parties is always feasible Ferna´ndez
et al. (2002). For instance, it is hard to expect that a new entrant to the German
Bundestag—the AfD party—will be treated by CDU/CSU in the same way as
SPD. Unfortunately, power indices are computationally challenging Chalkiadakis
et al. (2012); Matsui and Matsui (2000). Hence, various authors have recently
proposed dedicated algorithms for computing power indices in special cases of
graph-restricted weighted games Ferna´ndez et al. (2002); Skibski et al. (2015);
Benati et al. (2015); Skibski and Yokoo (2017).
Narayanam et al. Narayanam et al. (2014) introduce a game-theoretic centrality
measure based on the Shapley value in which the characteristic function is espe-
cially designed to promote “gatekeepers”—nodes that play an important role in
connecting their communities with the remainder of the network. They analyse
two application of their centrality measure: community detection and limiting the
spread of misinformation over the network.
Szczepan´ski et al. (2015a) use a class of solution concepts for pairs of players
in cooperative games that is based on semivalues—semivalue interaction indices
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(introduced in Section 2). They pair this class of solution concepts with group
k-degree centrality (where the value of a coalition, C, is the number of nodes
at least k nodes away from it) in order to analyse the similarity of nodes in net-
works. This has two main applications: link prediction and community detection.
In a missing information scenario, where random edges are removed from a net-
work, the authors show that their approach is competitive when compared with
the state-of-the-art methods in the literature. Szczepanski et al. (2016) continued
this research and develop a measure of node similarity for players that belong to
different communities. They base their measure on coalitional semivalues and re-
fer to it as coalitional semivalue interaction indices, which we also introduced in
Section 2. The authors also pair this solution concept with group k-degree cen-
trality and find that it is well-suited to predicting whether edges exist between
nodes that belong to different communities (i.e., the inter-links prediction prob-
lem). This is more complicated than the standard link-prediction problem, since
there are usually very few edges from nodes in one community to those in any
other community, meaning there is less information to base the similarity measure
on.
7 Conclusions
We have organised the literature on game-theoretic network centrality measures
into two categories and presented the relevant centrality measures and included
a short discussion of the computational complexity of each measure. We note
that whereas the measures based on connectivity are generally intractable, those
that are present in the literature that are not based on connectivity, are often com-
putable in polynomial time. This is a surprising result, given the complexity of
the solution concepts that these measures have adopted from cooperative game
theory. We also mention the work due to Skibski et al. (2017a), who organised
game-theoretic centrality measures according to their axiomatic properties.
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Appendix A: Summary of Main Notation
V The set of nodes.
E The set of edges.
ω : E → R Weight function that assigns to each edge a real number.
G = (V,E) Undirected graph with node set V and edge set E.
D = (V,E) Directed graph.
G = (V,E, ω) Undirected weighted graph with weight function ω.
D = (V,E, ω) Directed weighted graph.
C or S A coalition.
I A set of players of a cooperative game.
n The number of players in a cooperative game.
ν : 2I → R A characteristic function.
ν(C) A value of the coalition, where ν is characteristic function.
∆ν(C) The Harsanyi Dividend of C in the game ν.
β(k) The probability that a coalition of size k is chosen.
SVi(ν) The Shapley value of the player i in game ν.
u, v, s, t ∈ V The node from the set V .
deg(v) Degree of the node v.
E(v) Set of neighbours of node v ∈ V .
EIN(v) Set of in neighbours of node v ∈ V .
EOUT (v) Set of out neighbours of node v ∈ V .
dist(v, u) The distance from the node v and u.
MC(u, v) Marginal contribution that node u makes through node v.
ψ A group centrality measure.
φ A payoff division scheme.
CS A community structure (cover) of the set V .
Q A community such that Q ∈ CS.
T A coallition of communities, i.e. T ⊆ CS.
Sν(C, i, j) The synergy between i and j in the context of coalition C.
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